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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with private environmental governance at a global level. It tries
to grasp and analyse the phenomenon of the ‘Marine Stewardship Council’ (MSC) from
an International Relations perspective. In this understanding, the MSC provides an inno-
vative private environmental governance mechanism whose role and functions need to be
scrutinised. The underlying global governance debate suggests that new forms of prob-
lem-solving structures and processes are currently emerging, with a growth in regulatory
initiative and control by private actors. However, there is rather little evidence to which
degree the engagement of these actors in rule making and implementation on a global
level challenges and complements established governance systems that have become in-
effective. Accordingly, this thesis aims to generate a deeper understanding for the prob-
lems and opportunities of the Marine Stewardship Council in this context. For clarifica-
tion it poses the question ‘what is the potential of the MSC to exert environmental gov-
ernance in the issue area of fishing?’ Four criteria for governance potential are devel-
oped: (1) appropriateness of rules, (2) legitimacy of the governance mechanism, (3) be-
havioural changes of stakeholders triggered through the governance mechanism, and (4)
the ability of raising concern. The analysis reveals that while the MSC’s potential to ex-
ert environmental governance in the issue area of fishing remains limited at present, it is
likely that it increases in the near future. With regards to the global governance debate,
however, this thesis generates evidence that private governance initiatives will only be
able to complement public governance systems in a restricted manner.
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1 Problem Formulation
1.1 Subject Area
While human use of local ecosystems has always had environmental impacts, the global
dimensions of environmental change, caused by human activities, have become obvious
only during the last few decades. Environmental problems have emerged that exceed the
boundaries of nation-state territory. One way of distinguishing different problem sets is
to cluster them into problems that are related to (a) international commons, (b) trans-
boundary externalities, (c) linked issues concerning policy-integration, and (d) shared
natural resources (Young 1994).1 Generally, single nation-state actors cannot solve these
problems on their own; hence, states are becoming environmentally interdependent.
There is a need for co-operation and regulation beyond nation-state boundaries, and for
the development of transnational or sometimes even global governance systems in order
to avoid joint losses. Consequently, environmental institutions developed in order to
foster collective rule making and implementation in the environmental domain and to
close the governance gaps yawning in this area.
Many of these institutions, for various reasons, have not managed to meet their targets to
stop environmental degradation and solve the problems that initially led to their creation.
Achieving more sustainability seems to require different approaches and innovative
forms of governance. As the OECD analyses in its report on governance in the 21st cen-
tury,
“First, old forms of governance in both the public and private sectors are
becoming increasingly ineffective. Second, the new forms of governance
that are likely to be needed over the next few decades will involve a much
broader range of active players. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the
primary attributes of today’s governance systems – the usually fixed and
permanent allocation of power that are engraved in the structures and in-
stitutions of many organisations; [...] – look set to undergo fundamental
changes (OECD 2001, 5).
So far, studies in global environmental policy and international relations (IR) have in
general mainly focussed on nation-states as actors. They have been seen as the crucial
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intervening variable in solving transboundary environmental problems. For a long time
the role and function of different non-state actors appeared in the literature to be limited
to exerting influence on agenda-setting processes, to lobbying governments in a two-
level game, to providing expertise, to implementing and to monitoring international
agreements.
Only recently have researchers started to concentrate on the potential of business and
civil-society actors to explicitly set and enforce environmental rules and standards,
mostly in co-operation with, but sometimes also completely independent from, nation-
state governments and international organisations. Public-Private Partnerships (like the
World Commission on Dams, the UN Global Compact, or most of the Johannesburg
Type-II Partnerships) centred during the last years’ debates about new roles of private
actors in global environmental policy and have been studied to some extent (e.g. Risse
and Börzel 2003, Dingwerth 2003). In contrast, rather little is known about the potential
of emerging transnational private governance mechanisms in the shape of business-NGO
partnerships. Having its seed in a joint initiative of Unilever and the World Wide Fund
for Nature (WWF), the Marine Stewardship Council is dealing with environmental gov-
ernance on a global level. In this context, we understand governance as “the making and
implementation of rules and the exercise of power” (Keohane 2002, 2) and a mechanism
as a set of “recurrent processes that link specified initial conditions and a specific out-
come” (Mayntz 2002, 3). Therefore, the measures of the independent, global, non-profit
organisation Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) can be identified as a private govern-
ance mechanism.
The Marine Stewardship Council is setting environmental standards for fisheries and is
trying to enforce their implementation by introducing the marked-based instrument of
certification and eco-labelling respectively to the fishing industry. This instrument is
based on the idea that the MSC sustainability-certification, along with the permission to
use the MSC logo on products, brings about economic advantages for the fisheries that
are so promising that these apply for certification even though they might have to change
their practices according to the MSC standards. Consequently, the power of the Marine
                                                                                                                                                
1 This distinction is going to be discussed in further detail in section 2.1.
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Stewardship Council is not of coercive nature, but depending on the demand of labelled
products in the market place.
Certification organisations generally have two key components: (1) a set of rules, princi-
ples, or guidelines (usually in the form of a code of conducts), and (2) a reporting or
monitoring mechanism (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson and Sasser 2001). Although these pri-
vate codes of conduct are voluntary in nature, they can be qualified as regulative rules
when some degree of actors’ compliance is existent (Pattberg 2003). Thus, the MSC as a
co-operation between two private actors - a global business actor and one of the world’s
largest green NGOs - could exercise environmental governance.
This raises the question whether it could be seen as a complement or even an alternative
to public governance mechanisms, which generally have difficulties in managing the
resource fish in a sustainable manner on a global level. This thesis aims to explore the
potential of the private governance mechanism Marine Stewardship Council to exert en-
vironmental governance and contribute to the solution of problems related to the exploi-
tation of the natural resource fish.
1.2 Research Question
What is the Marine Stewardship Council’s potential to exert environmental governance
in the area of unsustainable fishing?
1.3 Background and Pre-Understanding
With regard to the deteriorating state of many eco-systems affected by common-action
problems, we believe that the established governance systems in most cases do not de-
liver the expected results (Vogler and Jordan 2003; Brühl and Rittberger 2003). Transna-
tional environmental problems are often too complex to be solved through the established
forms of governance. Facing the needs of a growing world population on the one hand
and simultaneously a ‘crisis of multilateralism’ (Loske 2003) on the other (think of the
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US refusal to strengthen any binding agreement on issues such as climate change; think
of the WSSD in Johannesburg, terrorism and the Iraq War, the 2003 WTO-conference in
Cancun etc.), undeniably gives rise to concerns about how to manage life on earth in the
future in a more sustainable manner.
“When it comes to meeting the challenge of governance we should focus on practice, on
implementation, on the right signals from governments, and on letting business respond
in the most efficient way” (Faulkner 1997, 158). We feel ambivalent about this opinion
of the Executive Director of the Business Council for Sustainable Development on the
role of business in environmental governance. However, in case that the astonishing in-
stitutionalised co-operation of antagonistic private actors could provide a way out of the
crisis and help overcoming the negotiation gridlock and implementation deficit in global
environmental policy, we would like to find out! With our project we would like to take
part in the ongoing controversy about the prospects of an emerging global environmental
governance architecture (Biermann 2002; Börzel and Risse 2003; Fuchs 2002; Keohane
2002; Rosenau 1997, 1999, 2002) and generate a deeper understanding about the prob-
lems and opportunities of private environmental governance in this discourse.
1.4 Methodology
Generating a deeper understanding about transnational private environmental governance
turns out to be demanding since the mechanisms are just coming into being. We are of
the opinion that it is therefore advisable to concentrate on the qualitative analysis of one
case study, the Marine Stewardship Council.
How to appraise the potential of the Marine Stewardship Council to exert environmental
governance? What do we mean by ‘potential’? Granted, it would be beyond our grasp to
try to deliver a holistic analysis of the all-embracing potential of a complex social phe-
nomenon such as the MSC. Therefore, in this section, we will develop the links between
the very comprehensive category ‘potential’ and our selection of its pivotal dimensions
that we will further explore in this project. In doing so, it will become clear that our me-
thodical approach is mainly inspired by analytical tools developed by regime analysis.
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To begin with, it is necessary to clarify our understanding of what the term ‘potential’
denotes in this paper. The Oxford English Dictionary stresses two main meanings of the
word ‘potential’:
(1) possessing potency or power; potent, powerful, mighty, strong; commanding, and
(2) possible as opposed to actual; existing in posse or in a latent or undeveloped state,
capable of coming into being or action.
Consequently, our research will broadly focus both (a) on the Marine Stewardship Coun-
cil’s power to exert environmental governance in the area of fishing at this point in time,
and (b) on its theoretical future prospects to do so.
1.4.1 Criteria for the assessment of the MSC’s governance potential
As mentioned above, Keohane defines governance as “the making and implementation of
rules, and the exercise of power, within a given domain of activity” (Keohane 2002, 2).2
We know that the MSC is making rules for sustainable fisheries in the shape of codes of
conduct - the question is whether they are appropriate to contribute to the solution of the
problem, whether they are implemented and whether it is the MSC that puts them into
action? What are the effects of the Marine Stewardship Council?
In order to gain an overview of the dimensions in which the Marine Stewardship Council
could possibly have effects, we will draw on an approach applied by scholars of regime
theory to assess the effectiveness of international institutions. Expanding the concept of
governance that we have introduced so far for a time-dimension reveals similarities be-
tween governance systems and regimes and helps to explain why we are going to operate
with parts of regime analysis. “Private environmental governance emerges out of a con-
text of interaction that is institutionalised and of a more permanent nature” (Falkner
2003, 73). The concepts of regimes and governance systems both fundamentally denote
the creation of different modes of rules over time. From the perspective of regime theory,
rules occur as four different types: (1) principles (beliefs of fact and causation); (2)
norms (rights and obligations); (3) regulations (pre- or proscriptions for action); proce-
                                                
2 The concept of ‘governance’ is going to be reviewed in further detail in section 2.1.
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dures (decision-making rules) (Krasner 1983, 2). Principles and norms provide the basic
characteristics of an institution, whereas regulations and procedures may change without
altering the substantial content of a regime. “To capture this important difference, some
scholars have argued for distinguishing between constitutive rules on the one hand, and
regulative rules on the other” (Pattberg 2003, 16). Governance systems are likewise in-
stitutional arrangements that structure and direct actors’ behaviour in an issue-specific
area both through generating constitutive and regulative rules (Falkner 2003). In this pa-
per we will follow Young 1994 and use the terms ‘regime’ and ‘governance system’ in-
terchangeably.
Research over the last decade by scholars of international relations has been concerned
with questions such as whether international regimes matter and how we would know?
(e.g. Green 1996; Keohane and Levy 1996; Mitchell 2001; Oberthür 1997; Schreurs and
Economy 1997; Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998; Young 1994/1999). In exploring
the potential of private environmental governance in one case study, we have to ask a
similar question at the beginning. Does the MSC matter and how do we find out whether
it matters? Consequently, it suggests itself to have a closer look at certain tools of regime
analysis for our assessment of the MSC.
The large body of research on regimes has shown that there are different possibilities of
how to grasp the effects of international regimes. The decision concerning which effects
are of importance seems to depend on the research interest of different authors and can be
described as ‘economic-political’, ‘juridical-political’, ‘process oriented-political’ or
even ‘multidimensional-political’ (Jakobeit 1998). However, as a common denominator
of their contemplation, these scholars come to the result that the crucial effects of a gov-
ernance system “can be evaluated along scales that measure either changes in the behav-
iour being regulated or changes in the environmental indicator that is the ultimate con-
cern of the institution” (Mitchell 2001, 17). We will mainly concentrate on behavioural
changes. In order to make this decision transparent, the probably the most sophisticated
distinction (‘multidimensional-political’) of different possible effects of governance sys-
tems by Oran Young 1994 is going to be summed up in the following:
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- Effects that contribute to the solution of the problem: this perspective on effects is
certainly the most convincing one. It asks whether governance systems have effects
in the sense that they operate to solve the problems that motivated parties to create
them in the first place. However, there are enormous difficulties in assessing the state
of the physical environment / complex ecosystems, especially when we are looking
on transboundary or global systems. It is rarely, if at all, possible to draw any simple
causal relation between a change in the environmental variable and the existence of a
governance system. Therefore, this project is not attempting to assess the ecological
effects of the MSC.
- Behavioural Effects: to us, the most appealing dimension of effects is to ask for any
behavioural changes that a governance system causes. Does its operation alter the be-
haviour of one or more of its stakeholders, either by doing things they would not oth-
erwise have done or by terminating or redirecting prior patterns of behaviour? Al-
though behavioural effects may be correlated with problem solving, there is no basis
for assuming that this will always be the case. Sometimes, the behavioural effects at-
tributable to the establishment of an international governance system may amount to
a form of displacement in the sense that they create a new problem in the process of
solving an old one.
- Evaluative Effects: we could ask whether a governance system produces results that
are efficient, equitable, legitimate, or robust. Does it provide cost-effective solutions,
is it generating outcomes that are just or fair, is it democratically accountable, is it
able to adapt to changing conditions etc.?
- Effects that contribute to the attainment of goals: Goal-oriented effects are a measure
of the extent to which a governance system’s (stated or unstated) goals are attained
over time. Goal attainment and problem solving do not need to go together. In our re-
search project we are not interested in this dimension since the attainment of self-set
goals as a criterion does not allow one to come to any interesting conclusions about
the potential of the MSC to exert environmental governance.
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- Constitutive Effects: a governance system has effects in the constitutive sense when it
gives rise to a social practice, involving the expenditure of time, energy and re-
sources, which therefore becomes a major focus of attention for its stakeholders.
Constitutive effects sometimes differ dramatically from the other conceptions. A so-
cial practice may flourish without having effects in the sense that its operation either
solves the problem that stimulated the governance systems creation or attains the
goals articulated by its founders. Nor does the emergence of a social practice con-
suming significant amounts of time and energy offer any guarantee that parties will
act to implement key provisions within their domestic jurisdictions or to ensure high
levels of compliance.
- Process Effects: this perspective is mainly applied to analyse the effects that the
regulation of a governance system has on the domestic legal and political systems of
nation-states. It also incorporates the extent to which those subject to a governance
system’s prescriptions actually comply with its requirements. However, perfect com-
pliance is not sufficient to solve problems when key provisions of a governance sys-
tem are either inadequate or inappropriate. Hence, we are going to discuss the appro-
priateness of key regulations (the code of conduct for sustainable fisheries) in the
case of the MSC.
Following from these considerations, we argue that exploring the MSC’s power to exert
environmental governance mainly means to investigate its effects on the behaviour of
the certified fisheries. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United
Nations (FAO), an estimated 25 percent of the major marine fish stocks are moderately
harvested, about 47 percent of them are fully exploited and another 28 percent are over-
exploited, standing for significantly declined and depleted stocks (FAO 2002, 23). Only
if the actors that are causing this overexploitation on the ground, the fishermen, have
incentives to alter their behaviour, there are prospects of using this resource in a sustain-
able manner. For this reason we will try to discover whether within the certified fisheries
the fishermen alter their behaviour due to the existence of rules established by the MSC.
Consequently, when speaking of changes in stakeholders’ behaviour, we mainly concen-
trate on the fishermen. Nonetheless, we do not neglect the impacts on other affected ac-
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tors such as processors, retailers, consumers, governmental bodies, and other interest
groups. This perspective should, however, neither be misunderstood as an oversimplifi-
cation of the complex societal reasons why fishermen behave the way they do, nor as an
attempt to put the blame solely on this group of actors.
Regrettably, it is not easy to generate causalities between a governance mechanism’s
existence and behavioural changes of the stakeholders that go beyond simple correlation.
As shown, a governance mechanism can contribute to multidimensional and complex
changes in actors’ behaviour. However, it is not the only variable that causes changes.
Actors are embedded in other constantly varying economical, political, technological,
and social environments that also might have effects on their behaviour. Hence, one has
to ask how the effects of the MSC can be measured exactly and how to isolate these ef-
fects from those that are caused by other variables? In this respect, regime analysis sug-
gests the concept of counterfactual reasoning:
We will follow the hypothetical question “How would the certified fisheries’ behaviour
have looked like without the existence of the Marine Stewardship Council?” Since we
cannot observe the true counterfactual situation in a laboratory experiment, we are trying
to examine the observable behaviour of the fisheries prior to their certification and try to
investigate the contribution of the MSC to possible changes.3
As mentioned above, behavioural effects may be correlated with problem solving, but
this is not necessarily the case. Therefore, it is also important to discuss the quality and
appropriateness of the created rules. This enables us to build up a qualified argument
about the MSC’s potential to exert environmental governance in the problem area of un-
sustainable fishing.
Furthermore, we will touch upon the dimension of the MSC’s evaluative effects such as
its legitimacy and accountability since we consider these issues to ultimately determine
its potential in the long run; e.g. should innovative forms of governance turn out not to be
legitimate, they cannot be seen as complements or alternatives to forms of public govern-
                                                
3 It is noticed that, in order to strengthen the argumentation, a more sophisticated form of counterfactual
reasoning would also include investigations on the behaviour of other comparable fleets after the genesis of
the MSC that have not been certified. Regrettably, the time frame of this project was too limited to do so.
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ance. Due to time restrictions, the investigation of evaluative effects will, however, re-
main superficial to some extent and leave enough room for other research projects to
follow.
Haas, Keohane and Levy developed an understanding of the effects of governance insti-
tutions that became generally known as the ‘3 Cs’. In order to round off our analysis, we
incorporate one more perspective on the possible effects of the MSC. “Any effective ac-
tion of international institutions with respect to the global environment is likely to follow
a path that increases Concern, or Capacity, or improves the Contractual environment”
(Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993, 21). If one accepts this framework, then an effective
governance system should be designed so that its rules address whichever of these three
factors appears to be lacking. In the case of the Marine Stewardship Council, it raises for
us the question whether the organisation manages to increase concern? The MSC’s ef-
fects rest on a market-based instrument, which means that ultimately the consumers’
choice determines whether fisheries apply for certification at all.4 Therefore, another im-
portant impact determining the MSC’s potential is its PR-work and awareness-raising
campaign. In this respect the potential of the MSC rises with the extent to which it is able
to promote and communicate its work.
In sum, we are going to assess the potential of the Marine Stewardship Council to exert
environmental governance against four criteria: (1) the appropriateness of the MSC Code
of Conduct for Sustainable Fisheries, (2) the behavioural effects of this code on the fish-
eries, (3) legitimacy and accountability, and (4) the ability to increase concern. We would
like to point out that we attach unequal importance to these four criteria. Even though
others are revealing that problems related to accountability and the democratic legitimacy
of governance mechanisms are at least as important as those related to the regulatory
dimension mainly discussed here (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002), the top priority of our
analysis lies on the investigation of behavioural effects caused through Marine Steward-
ship Council rules.
                                                
4 For an explanation of the market-based instrument of eco-labelling see section 3.3.
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1.4.2 Working Questions
Analysing the potential of this NGO-business co-operation means to investigate different
dimensions, following these working questions:
- Are the established rules environmentally sound, do they really contribute to the so-
lution of the problem?
- Do the rules established by the Marine Stewardship Council change the behaviour of
the fishers on the ground?
- What does the design, development and changes of the MSC indicate for its future
potential; is this governance mechanism democratically accountable, is it legitimate?
- Does the MSC raise stakeholders’ concern for problems related to fishing?
1.4.3 Methods
To answer our research question we will use a mixture of methods. Firstly, the more
theoretical part about global environmental governance is based on a thorough literature
review. Secondly, we initially intended to analyse the Marine Stewardship Council’s
effects through studying all of the seven MSC certified fisheries.5 We tried to get in con-
tact with representatives of these fisheries in order to find an answer to the question
whether they altered their behaviour due to their involvement with the MSC. Since we
managed to interview only four stakeholders (one through a telephone interview and a
questionnaire, two through telephone interviews only, and one through a questionnaire
only) this method did not deliver sufficient information for our analysis. However, we
are using the conducted interviews to support our argumentation with valuable informa-
tion of stakeholders on the ground and their ideas about the Marine Stewardship Council.
The telephone interviews have been conducted as semi-structured exploratory interviews
to allow for openness, while maintaining focus on the key issue of possible behavioural
changes caused by the MSC. The interviews have been recorded. Exploratory interviews
                                                
5 The number of seven certified fisheries was exhaustive at the time we started our investigation. However,
during the last weeks of our research three new fisheries achieved certification that could not be included
any more.
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are supposed to be open and have little structure. They introduce an issue and follow up
on the interviewees’ answers and seek new information about and new angles on the
topic (Kvale 1996). Whereas the two questionnaires have been structured and have in-
vestigated the interviewees’ opinion on the effects of the MSC on the fishery. The inter-
viewees were chosen due to their function in the fisheries of co-ordinating the intended
collaboration with the Marine Stewardship Council and should therefore be highly fa-
miliar with the process of certification and its implications.6
In order to be in the position of analysing possible effects on all the fisheries, thirdly, we
decided to mainly base our analysis on reviewing assessment reports on the fisheries that
have been carried out by independent certifiers.7 These reports assess the fisheries in de-
tail in terms of their sustainability and document fishing and management methods of the
fisheries before the certification. Most importantly, in some cases they point out requests
to the fisheries to correct certain practices in accordance to the MSC standard. Since fol-
low up surveys are available we can also study whether these requests have been imple-
mented by the fisheries and thereby answer the question whether the MSC caused any
behavioural changes.
Taken together, the methods used should (a) enable us to make some close guesses about
what the behaviour of the fisheries would have looked like without the existence of the
MSC as well as (b) provide sufficient information to discuss aspects of the MSC’s le-
gitimacy and accountability and indicate its concern-raising effects.
1.4.4 Limitations
As the MSC is less than a decade old, the ink has only just dried on some important pro-
tocols and declarations. The discipline of international relations has shown that interna-
tional governance system are dynamic and can change dramatically over time, e.g.
through different feedback effects (Oberthür 1997), or windows of opportunity that allow
                                                
6 A contact list of our interviewees is to be found in the appendix, 9.2.
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for a sudden tightening of measures. A ‘cascade of norms’ (Finnamore and Sikkink
1998) in the area of fishery governance might take time to develop and at the time of our
analysis the Marine Stewardship Council is definitely in an early stage. Within the
months of April and May, three new fisheries have gained certification, while another
eleven are in the pipeline8, indicating that this organisation is gaining momentum. Thus,
in some respect an analysis of its potential might be a balancing act and perhaps even
premature in terms of tracing its impacts. Furthermore, we are analysing only one case
study; thus we do not expect to come to a general, solid ‘take-away’ message that is rat-
ing the implications of private environmental governance. Moreover, such a message is
not easy to find when one attempts to dive deeply into a complex issue.
1.5 Outline and importance of each section
The second chapter of the project deals with developing the conceptual framework of
private environmental governance. It is providing the theoretical background of how IR
has explained the development and performance of transnational governance systems in
general, showing that global environmental policy has come a long way that could be
interpreted as a “transformation from environmental government to governance” (Vogler
and Jordan 2003).
Accordingly, we will introduce global governance as a perspective that broadens our
scope on global environmental policy (‘What is global governance?’ section 2.1.1). Sec-
tion 2.1.2 is explaining why there is a need to govern environmental problems at a trans-
national level at all. Subsequently, the question how these problems have been ap-
proached is going to be addressed and section 2.2 is giving a restricted literature review
on different explanations for the changing role of private actors in global policy-making.
                                                                                                                                                
7 In important point within the structure of the MSC is that independent third party certifiers carry out
certification and monitoring. For details see section 4.1.4. A contact list of the certifiers is to be found in
the appendix 9.1.3.
8 Fisheries that are currently undergoing assessment are: Alaska Pollock, Australian Mackerel Icefish,
British Columbia Salmon, California Chinook Salmon, Chilean Hake, Hastings Fishing Fleet Dover Sole
Fishery, Hastings Fishing Fleet Pelagic Fishery, North Sea Herring, Pacific Halibut (Alaska, Washington &
Oregon), Pacific Halibut (British Columbia, Canada), Sablefish (Alaska).
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Taken together, these steps make clear the ‘crazy-quilt’ nature of environmental govern-
ance institutions, going beyond the traditional state-centric perspective and making inno-
vative forms of co-operations in the environmental area apparent.
A consideration of the environmental problem of unsustainable fishing is undertaken in
chapter 3. Different approaches of management and regulation of this problem are out-
lined; in particular, economics and market-based incentives are explored.
The project’s fourth chapter is devoted to our case study on the Marine Stewardship
Council. Its organisational structure is scrutinised (4.1) and seven MSC certified fisheries
are investigated (4.2).
“Over the past three decades, most relationships between the private sector and civil so-
ciety have been founded upon conflict” (Murphy & Bendall 2002). The sudden co-
operation between Unilever and the WWF raises our curiosity about its impacts.
The different chapters require different scientific skills, ranging environmental science to
economics and political science, and are therefore interdisciplinary. Following the guid-
ing working questions will prepare the ground for a critical analysis of the potential of
one private transnational governance mechanism in the in chapter 5. Finally, we draw
conclusions in chapter 6 and give an outlook on intriguing issues within the area of
global environmental governance (chapter 7).
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2 Global Environmental Governance
The discipline of international relations originally covered only the relations between
nation-states. Governance, however, does not seem to be merely an affair of states any
longer. “Modern societies have in recent decades seen a destabilisation of the traditional
governing mechanisms and the advancement of new arrangements of governance” (van
Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004, 143).
Throughout this paper we follow the proposal of Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat 2001
and distinguish among five broad categories of actors:
(1) We will refer to states including associations of them (such as G-8, EU) also as pub-
lic actors.
(2) International Organisations (IOs) including intergovernmental bodies (such as UN
organisations, Bretton Woods institutions, treaty secretariats, development banks, and
regional organisations).
(3) We use business-actors and private sector interchangeably to describe for-profit en-
tities and non-profit associations promoting business interests (such as the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce).
(4) We use NGOs and civil society to include the diverse universe of interest groups,
advocacy groups and citizens’ associations.
However, when summarising business-actors and NGOs in one group, we will simply
speak of private actors. Therefore our definition of private governance includes both
civil-society and business-actors.
(5) We use experts to refer to government and non-government individuals with special-
ised technical, regulatory or scientific knowledge who advise or make decisions in
global rule-making and regulation; and we use epistemic communities to refer to
transnational groups of experts who conduct common discourse based on shared
knowledge.
(6) We use the term non-state actors to sum up the private sector, civil society, and
epistemic communities and thereby oppose them to states.
These groupings are admittedly somewhat artificial given the diverse cast of characters
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and networks they are forming – but they provide a useful categorisation (Simmons and
de Jonge Oudraat 2001).
After clarifying our understanding of ‘governance’ in further detail, this chapter is trying
to answer the fundamental questions why there is a need for transnational or sometimes
even global governance in the environmental area, how this environmental governance
has been exerted so far and by whom? We are arguing that global governance is the ap-
propriate lens to analyse current basic trends in global environmental policy and there-
fore the pivotal concept to understand the challenges and opportunities that an organisa-
tion such as the Marine Stewardship Council brings about.
Furthermore, this chapter provides a literature review of explanations for changes in the
forms and mechanisms and the location of governance and introduces the concept of
business-NGO partnerships in section 2.2.2.
2.1 Global Environmental Governance – unravelling a crazy quilt
2.1.1 What is ‘global governance’?
At first glance it seems that governance is a buzzword. The Online Contents catalogue of
journals, for instance, returned 24 hits on the term ‘governance’ in 1990. This number
increased to 510 in 1999 and 603 in 2000. Today, one can find ‘governance’ in such a
wide range of scientific discourses that this inspired some authors to explore the con-
cept’s suitability for serving as a bridge between the different disciplines (van Kersber-
gen and van Waarden 2004). German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder recently gave the
opening address at the first Annual Symposium of the newly founded Hertie School of
Governance in Berlin. Strangely enough, the word ‘governance’ does not even exist in
some languages, such as German. So, is this focus much ado about nothing or more an
expression of fundamental societal changes?
The New English Dictionary defines governance as “the manner of governing, control-
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ling, directing or regulating influence”. In order to fathom the meaning of governance,
Rosenau and Czempiel emphasise the distinction between governance and government.
While both words refer to purposive behaviour and to goal-oriented activities, govern-
ment suggests activities that were backed up by formal authority, whereas governance
refers to activities backed up by shared goals.
“Governance in other words is a more encompassing phenomenon than
government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes
informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and or-
ganisations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs and fulfil
their wants” (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, 4).
These informal mechanisms of governance are, in comparison to governmental ones,
based upon non-hierarchical forms of steering. Hierarchical modes of steering are usually
reserved for states and public actors who can allocate values authoritatively and enforce
rules. To put it differently: “We enter the realm of governance, the more we include non-
hierarchical forms of steering and non-state actors” (Börzel and Risse 2002, 2).
Table 1: The Realm of Governance. (Source: Risse and Börzel 2002, 3)
          Actors involved
Steering modes
Public Actors only Public and Private
Actors
Private Actors only
Hierarchical:
Top-Down; (Threat of)
sanctions
- Traditional nation-
state
- Supranational In-
stitutions
Non-Hierarchical I:
Positive incentives;
bargaining
- Intergovernmental
bargaining - Delegation of pub-
lic functions to pri-
vate actors
- Corporatism
- Private regimes
- Private-private
partnerships
(NGOs-companies)
Non-Hierarchical II:
Non-manipulative per-
suasion (learning, ar-
guing etc.)
- Institutional prob-
lem-solving
- Public-private net-
works
- Bench-marking
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Rosenau further notes that with few exceptions “governance tends to be employed when
it is modified by the adjective ‘global’. Otherwise, for any scale short of the global, ‘gov-
ernment’ is usually treated as the entity through which order is sought” (Rosenau 2002,
71). Discussions on the concept of global governance are highly controversial and par-
ticipants in these debates disagree about the nature, extent, and implications, if not its
mere existence. On a very general level, there are some similarities in the different con-
cepts of global governance: it is conceptualised as a move toward multi-actor, multi-level
decision-making in world politics. New forms of problem-solving structures and proc-
esses are pointed out, with a growth in regulatory initiative and control by sub-state, su-
pra-state, and non-state actors.
“Thus, scholars describe a change of the international system from a state-
centric to a multi-centric one with multiple sources of power and loci of
authority. The core of the global governance argument concerns the acqui-
sition of authoritative decision-making capacity by non-state and supra-
state actors ” (Fuchs 2002, 11).
In this respect, our project operates at the very heart of this ongoing debate. Global gov-
ernance optimists claim that private actors have successfully established themselves as
political agents, having both a significant direct and indirect impact on international pol-
icy. On the contrary, a substantial number of scholars are highly sceptical regarding the
potential extent of global governance. They highlight a persistent enforcement gap and
have doubts about the capacity of the ‘new actors’ (Fuchs 2002). Through our project, we
hope to generate evidence and thereby define our own position in this debate.
The concept of global governance denotes fundamental societal changes and departs
from more traditional ones in IR in four distinct ways. As an analytical tool the concept
includes: "(1) non-state actors, (2) analyses multiple spatial and functional levels of poli-
tics, (3) is concerned with new mechanisms of producing and maintaining global public
goods, and (4) highlights the establishment of new spheres of authority beyond the nation
state” (Pattberg 2003, 6).
At the most general level, global governance is the sum of all existing “channels through
which ‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pur-
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sued, the sum of myriad – literally millions – of control mechanisms driven by different
histories, goals, structures, and processes” (Rosenau 1997, 27). Global environmental
governance is emphasising that the scope on global politics lies in the environmental
issue-area. From a global environmental governance perspective it will become possible
to achieve a better overview of the mechanisms that regulate behaviour in this area by
widening the traditional state-centric perspective.
2.1.2 Why to govern environmental problems on a transnational level?
At the beginning of the seventies, scholars of international relations realised that eco-
nomic exchange in the international system was growing constantly, causing a specific
relationship between nation states that was described as complex interdependence. This
term, introduced by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, refers to the various, complex
transnational connections, interdependencies, between states and societies (Keohane and
Nye 1977). Reflecting on the relaxing situation between the conflict parties in the late
seventies period of the Cold War, they argued that with the decline of military force as a
policy-tool and with the increase in economic and ecological forms of interdependence
the probability of co-operation among states increases as well. Almost thirty years later
Keohane emphasises that “people’s lives can be fundamentally changed, or ended, as a
result of decisions made only days or moments earlier, thousands of miles away. In other
words, interdependence is high” (Keohane 2002, 1).
With regard to global environmental governance, ecological interdependence is becom-
ing a central category in explaining the rise of environmental co-operation in the interna-
tional system.
“Interdependence gives rise to collective-action problems in the sense that
actors left to their own devices in an interdependent world frequently suf-
fer joint losses as a result of conflict or are unable to reap joint gains be-
cause of an inability to co-operate” (Young 1994, 15).
Moreover, the increasing probability for co-operation among different actors in the inter-
national system can be illustrated by taking a closer look at the specific structures of
THE MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF A
PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
25
transnational environmental problems. Following Young, different problem sets can be
classified: International Commons, Shared Natural Resources, Transboundary External-
ities, and Linked Issues. In other words, “clusters of interactive situations” (Young 1994,
19), in which groups of interdependent actors are likely to suffer mutual losses in the
absence of effective governance systems.
- In 1968, the biologist Garrit Hardin introduced the term ‘Tragedy of the Commons’
for a situation, where actors with free access to common goods tend to overuse the
given resource and thereby destroy it in the long run (he was working on the example
of common farmland, but the most prominent one nowadays certainly are atmos-
phere/stratosphere and oceans and their limited waste-storage capacity).9 Commons
are “physical or biological systems that lie wholly or largely outside the jurisdiction
of any of the individual members of a society but that are valued resources for many
segments of society” (Young 1994, 20).
- Non-renewable resources are defined as “physical or biological systems that extend
into or across the jurisdictions of two or more members of international society”
(Young 1994, 22). Although it appears to be obvious that the establishment of joint
institutions could solve these kinds of problems, the management of shared resources
is not a simple matter. This projects’ case study is dealing with a problem set of
shared resources (fish stocks) and will provide further evidence for these difficulties.
- “Transboundary externalities arise when activities that occur wholly within the juris-
diction of individual states produce results that affect the welfare of those residing in
other jurisdictions” (Young 1994, 20). Cases such as acid rain in Europe or the nu-
clear power plant accident of Chernobyl showed that negative externalities do not
know any political border and have to be managed on a supranational level.
- Finally, linked issues arise when social institutions that are supposed to deal with
environmental problems have impacts on other regimes and vice versa. This can be
illustrated by the fact that environmental concerns sometimes lead to the formulation
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of import restrictions for products from states with low environmental standards.
These can interfere with norms and rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, for example the US import restrictions for Shrimps and Tuna. ‘Policy integra-
tion’ is therefore going to be one of the major issues on the future environmental
policy agenda.
Accordingly, these transnational environmental problems cannot be solved by the action
of only one or a few individual actors in the international system. They have to be seen as
common action problems - global change requires global action. Game theory10 is often
applied in order to understand in which problem sets co-operation among stakeholders is
most likely to occur. Games such as Prisoners’ Dilemma, Co-ordination Game, or Battle
of the Sexes explain that rationale actors generally tend to co-operate in the long run in
order to avoid mutual losses and sub-optimal outcomes.
2.1.3 How to govern environmental problems on a transnational level?
There are different ideas of how to tackle these problem sets. Some argue for a World
Organisation for Environment and Development and for a major change of the interna-
tional systems’ structure (e.g. Biermann and Simonis 1998, 2000). In such a conception,
political power would be redistributed and a sort of ‘eco-world-government’ could limit
the principle of state sovereignty by interfering into former nation state affairs. A few
others are of the opinion that the total privatisation of common goods could solve the
problems (see Dryzek 1996, Chapter 6).
However, these proposals remain ideas and the world is far away from a global constitu-
tion. The established way of managing environmental collective-action problems on a
transnational level is (a) the development of governance systems or institutions in the
                                                                                                                                                
9 However, Harding admitted that the English philosopher David Hume already had come 200 years previ-
ously to similar conclusions.
10 Game theory is a mathematical model used to study problems in economics, and, to a lesser but still
significant extent, political science and psychology as well. It is used to study interactions with formalised
incentive structures ("games"). The predicted and actual behaviour of individuals in these games are stud-
ied, as well as optimal strategies. Seemingly different types of interactions can be characterised as having
similar incentive structures, thus all being examples of one particular game.
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shape of international regimes and (b) the creation of governance mechanisms in the
mould of international organisations.
Following Krasner’s standard definition, “regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983, 2). In
contrast to international organisations (IOs), regimes are not material entities; they have
no budgets, employees or offices. Generally based on international treaties, they are not
actors but a social construction consisting of agreements and expectations that regulate
the behaviours of actors in one issue area.
Although some regional environmental regimes already arose around the Stockholm
Conference in 1972, fifteen years later the Brundtland Commission underlined that “the
integrated and interdependent nature of the new challenges and issues contrasts sharply
with the nature of institutions that exist today” (WCED 1987, 310). Consequently, it was
seen as crucial by most of the states participating in the following process of the Rio
Summit of 1992 (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
UNCED) to foster the further institutionalisation of international co-operation. In order to
do so, several international conventions could be agreed upon. “By comparison with the
normally glacial progress of international institution building, the 1990s represented a
period of unprecedented institutional innovation” (Vogler and Jordan 2003, 140).
Framework conventions on climate (1992) and biodiversity (1992) were negotiated, a
steady strengthening of the ozone depletion regime followed the 1987 Montreal Protocol,
and Agenda 21 provided a vast blueprint for implementing sustainable development. At
the same time, international conventions on the transport of hazardous wastes (1989) and
desertification (1994) were developed, along with a network of regional environmental
agreements.
Realist and Institutionalist scholars of international relations, and in particular of regime
theory, see the nation-state as the pivotal actor in the international system. They draw,
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however, different conclusions on the probability and relevance of transnational govern-
ance institutions, becoming entangled in one of IRs ongoing major debates: 11
“The realist research programme denies any significant independent role
for intergovernmental institutions and organisations, or for non-state ac-
tors. Institutionalists have argued that inter-governmental co-operation is
both theoretically possible and empirically undeniable” (Biermann 2002,
1).
As indicated in section 1.2, assessing the effects of regimes is rather difficult. The rele-
vant literature lacks a consensual definition of how to evaluate the overall-effects of gov-
ernance systems. What do we mean when we ask whether a regime matters? By talking
about complex eco-systems whose processes and interconnections are by far scientifi-
cally not fully understood, it is not possible to draw any causal relationship between the
measured changes in an eco-system and the existence of a regime. In fact, changes in
these systems often take long time periods. Hence, the impact of a regime on the envi-
ronment sometimes could become obvious only in 50, 100 or maybe a 1000 years time.
On a very general level,
“Any claim that an institution was effective, whether in terms of behaviour
or environmental quality and in terms of the goal or some prior baseline,
implies that, absent the institution, outcomes would have been different”
(Mitchell 2002, 18).
There are certainly different dimensions of effectiveness, however, in terms of counter-
factual reasoning on changes of the environmental indicator (‘how much did the institu-
tion contribute to improve the state of the environment?’), further or increased environ-
mental degradation in areas like biodiversity, desertification etc. shows that the overall
success of existing environmental regimes is rather limited. Vogler and Jordan summa-
rise that “the one overwhelming conclusion from much of this work [regime-analysis]
was that, there were significant, and on occasion apparently insurmountable problems in
translating international agreements into sustainable solutions on the ground.” (Vogler
and Jordan 2003, 141.)
                                                
11 For an introduction into this debate see Richard Little 1997.
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In their investigations on the transformation from international to global governance
Brühl and Rittberger likewise argue that the present international governance systems are
ineffective. They see two dimensions in which these systems turn out to fail.
”First, today’s international governance systems have not been able ade-
quately to meet the demands on their policy-making capabilities. This is
especially true for ’trans-sovereign problems’, i.e. problems extending
across state borders in an almost uncontrollable way. Second, new actors
have entered the world stage. [...] A critical assessment of international
governance systems clearly demonstrates that they fail to deal with the
new actors’ aspirations. The attainment of governance goals by interna-
tional governance systems, in which states play a paramount role, seems to
be extremely difficult, if not impossible” (Brühl and Rittberger 2002, 19-
20).
While international regimes were generally seen as the basis of international order in an
anarchic world of sovereign states - Joseph Nye once invented the picture of islands of
order in the ocean of anarchy - “scant regard was initially paid to the accumulating evi-
dence of significant involvement in international institutions by a range of non-state ac-
tors” (Vogler and Jordan 2003, 148). Consequently, scholar started to focus on the rise of
non-state actors and the growing influence of private authority. The rationale of govern-
ment-private sector interaction has thereby been studied in some detail under the headline
of public-private partnerships. These partnerships are already involving non-state actors
in the process of rule making. They represent, however, only one type of private govern-
ance on a continuum ranging from more traditional inter-state negotiations, to fully pri-
vate co-operations (Pattberg 2003).
Table 2: Examples of global governance mechanisms according to actor constella-
tion and purpose. (Source: Pattberg 2003)
     Actor Constellation
Purpose
Public Hybrid Private
Service Provision UNEP Global Reporting Ini-
tiative (GRI)
Privatisation of water
services (e.g. Thames
Water)
Implementation Global Environment
Facility (GEF)
Global Network on
Energy (GNESD)
Cement Sustainability
Initiative
Rule-making Johannesburg Summit World Commission on
Dams (WCD)
Marine Stewardship
Council
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This distinction notices the different actors that are involved in the process of generating
formal and informal norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures. Conse-
quently, one could distinguish between public, hybrid and private governance. Table 2 is
showing examples of different environmental governance mechanisms according to the
actors involved and their purpose.
2.2 Private actors and global governance
So far, we have argued that there is a need for innovative forms of transnational govern-
ance systems that facilitate co-operation in order to solve certain environmental prob-
lems. We will now turn to the changing perception of the role of private actors in trans-
national environmental policy and give a restricted literature review on how different
authors explain why rule making increasingly tends to include private actors (section
2.2.1). The idea of this review is to point out that the emergence of a private governance
mechanism such as the MSC is not just an oddity but likely to reflect a general trend that
private governance is an increasing element of the modern world and that the problems
and opportunities it presents need to be explored in more detail. Moreover, the back-
ground of business-NGO co-operations is going to be discussed in section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 The changing role of private actors in global politics
While there are less than 200 governments in the global system, there are approximately
- 60,000 major transnational companies (TNCs), such as Shell, Microsoft, Unilever, or
Daimler-Crysler;12
- 10,000 single-country non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Freedom
House (USA) or Population Concern (UK) who have significant international activi-
ties; and
                                                
12 TNC: “in the most general sense any company based in one country that has dealings with the society or
government in another country. However, the term TNC is normally reserved for a company that has affili-
ates in a foreign country. The affiliates may be branches of the parent company, separately incorporated
subsidiaries or associates, with large minority shareholdings.” (Willets 2001, 362)
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- 5,800 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), such as Amnesty In-
ternational, the International Red Cross, the World Wildlife Fund, plus a similar
number of less well established networks of NGOs. (see Willets 2001, 366.)
This group of private actors in global policy making is very heterogeneous and it some-
times causes confusion to put actors into a single category that have very different struc-
tures, different resources, and different ways of influencing policy making.
At the Rio Summit in 1992, private actors were officially integrated into the political
process for the first time. It became apparent that environmental governance was no
longer exclusively achieved by governments negotiating with governments:
“Whereas for most of the 20th century, private actors only tried to influence
agenda-setting processes by lobbying states and international institutions,
today, they are involved in all stages and phases of world politics: they are
active partners in agenda setting, norm and rule formulation, and imple-
mentation” (Brühl 2002, 371).
What are the reasons for this ‘privatisation’ of global environmental governance? In-
creasing involvement of private actors in politics is generally not new, but an essential
element of the genesis of the liberal societies. Their involvement remained, however, for
a long time restricted to individual national contexts. As Pattberg points out, the term
non-state actors enfolds its conceptual usefulness only within the Westphalian system of
sovereign states. It falls short of explaining questions of relative power and influence
under the conditions of feudalism or tribalism, because these social institutions are not
organised around centralised authority, but rather a whole network of interlocking ties
and responsibilities.13 To stress the importance of non-state actors in a historic perspec-
tive, it is to acknowledge that the usefulness of this concept very much depends on the
appropriate timeframe (Pattberg 2003). We operate in the timeframe of the system of
modern nation-states and like to develop an understanding for Rosenau assessment of the
new role of private actors on the transnational level as “so thoroughgoing as to bring
                                                
13 Many political developments in fact originated from the action of individuals or collectives different
from those formally in power. For example, the conquest of the Americas was supported and later utilised
by authoritative actors such as the Spanish Crown, but its driving force was the imagination and motivation
of individuals and economic actors, such as Columbus and the Fugger Bank.
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about the first turbulence in world politics since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648” (Ro-
senau 1997, 37).
Critics of neo-liberal globalisation often see the deregulation and economic liberalisation
as the reasons for the rise of private actors in the global arena. A closer look at this phe-
nomenon makes unequivocally clear that there is no single explanation. Instead, the
driving forces turn out to be so complex and located on different levels from the local to
the transnational that their exploration in this paper will not be exhaustive.
Brühl introduces three factors that contribute to the growing significance of private ac-
tors: (1) the economic liberalisation increases the number of TNCs as well as it strength-
ens their position in world politics, while at the same time it provokes the formation of an
opposing network (consisting of NGOs), “which might be interpreted as a rudimentary
form of an evolving world community”. Furthermore, (2) the development of new infor-
mation technologies would foster the formation and emancipation of civil society, and
(3) the end of the Cold War would speed up privatisation tendencies (Brühl 2002, 371).
The information revolution is also crucial for Ann M. Florini. She is the opinion that the
most important driver for change in the nature of groups that are able to carry out gov-
ernance flows from the information revolution. New types of technologies substantially
increased the number of collective action problems to be solved. At the same time they
also altered the relative capabilities of different types of actors to solve them, in particu-
lar increasing the capacity of non-state actors relative to states and creating a much larger
number of players in the international system (Florini 2000).
Rosenau in comparison, analyses transformations of the political context in three differ-
ent parameters:
“Where the macro parameter has for centuries involved dominance by the
anarchic system of nation states, lately the overall structure of world poli-
tics has undergone a bifurcation in which a multicentric system of diverse
types of actors has emerged to rival the state-centric system. The transfor-
mation of the macro-micro parameter has involved movement of authority
structures from being in place to being in crises. As for the micro parame-
ter, it is conceived to have undergone changes wherein the analytic skills
of citizens have expanded substantially (Rosenau 1997, 37)
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He observes the evolution of a new form of anarchy in the modern world, which is not
only characterised by the absence of a highest authority, but also by the disaggregation of
nation-state authority. Facing the inability to solve the environmental problems, govern-
mental output legitimacy is declining. As a result, authority is simultaneously moving up
towards supranational groups and down to sub-national actors.
Table 3: Transformation of three global parameters. (Source: Rosenau 1997, 37)
From To
Micro parameter Individuals less analytically skilful
and emotionally competent
Individuals more analytically
skilful and emotionally competent
Macro-micro parameter Authority structures in place as
people rely on traditional and/or
constitutional sources of legiti-
macy to comply with directives
emanating from appropriate macro
institutions
Authority structures in crisis as
people evolve performance crite-
ria for legitimacy and compliance
with the directives issued by
macro-officials
Macro parameter Anarchic system of nation- states Bifurcation of anarchic system
into state- and multi-centric sub-
systems
In accordance with Rosenau, Beck also sees the appearance of powerful non-state actors
on the global level. To him, new (environmental) risks are the central category for the
explanation of this phenomenon and the redistribution of authority:
“The legal order no longer guarantees social peace, because it generalises
and legitimises the threats to life. Consequently, there is a reversal of what
is politics and what is not politics. The political is becoming non-political,
and the non-political political. The hour of subpolitics is sounding” (Beck
1996, 15).
“The concept of ‘subpolitics’ refers to politics outside and beyond repre-
sentative institutions of the political system of nation-states. It focuses at-
tention on signs of an (ultimately global) self-organisation of politics,
which tends to set all arenas of society in motion. Subpolitics means ‘di-
rect’ politics – that is ad hoc individual participation in political decisions,
bypassing the institutions of representative opinion-formation (political
parties, parliaments) and often even lacking the protection of the law. In
other words, subpolitics means the shaping of society from below” (Beck
1996, 19).
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The incompetence of governments to solve the complex environmental problems is also
evident for Dryzek. In his discourse analysis he comes to the conclusion that the admin-
istrative state’s performance has been called into question.
“This questioning can often be put under the heading of ‘implementation
deficit’ – a substantial gap between what legislation and high-level execu-
tive decisions declare will be achieved and what is actually achieved at
street level in terms of attainment of environmental standards. More gener-
ally, the administrative state may be running out of steam in the environ-
mental arena, or experiencing diminishing returns to effort” (Drysek 1996,
79).
In his opinion, government administrations could not be effective in solving complex
problems, because of their inherent Weberian organisation structure. Relevant knowledge
could not be centralised in administrative hierarchy. Instead, it would be compartmental-
ised which majorly obstructed the development of successful policies and solutions. He
claims “the democratisation of environmental administration has been a felt need to se-
cure legitimacy for decisions by involving a broader public” (Dryzek 1996, 86).
Finally, Risse and Börzel are summing up how these changes have been reflected in the
IR research programme. They are stating that for the last few decades, research on inter-
national institutions has concentrated on inter-state regimes solving collective action
problems.
“To the extent that non-state actors were taken into consideration at all,
they appeared either as actors shaping state interest through domestic poli-
tics (cf. the literature on “two level games”) or as transnational actors lob-
bying international negotiations and/or International Organizations (IOs).
Only recently did they emerge in the IR literature as direct partners of na-
tional governments and IOs in structures of international governance”
(Börzel and Risse 2003, 41).
In sum, this review shows that there are many different explanations for the ongoing
changes. However, they point into the same direction of an existing governance gap in
the capacities of nation-states. It is furthermore indicating that new forms of governance
are needed to respond to the scale and complexity of problems and to the changing con-
text within which they have to be tackled. Even critics of the concept of a drastically
changing role of state and private actors in transnational environmental politics, like
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Martin Jänicke (‘No withering away from the nation state’), admit the existence of this
governance gap. “In general we are not very successful in the field of environmental
protection. The global economic development increases at the same time the level of en-
vironmental pressure and the capacity to react to environmental problems. The race be-
tween both tendencies may not be won by environmental policy” (Jänicke 2001, 137).
The potential of private actors - NGOs, TNCs and epistemic communities, in different
functions and constellations - to fill these adumbrated gaps in international environ-
mental policy is highly controversial. As mentioned above, one constellation in which
private actors are getting involved in global governance is partnerships. Since the Marine
Stewardship Council emerged out of a partnership between Unilever and the WWF it is
of interest to clarify the concept of business-NGO partnerships in the environmental area.
2.2.2 The concept of business-NGO partnerships
“Partnership is not the first word that usually comes to mind when one thinks about
business and NGOs” (Murphy and Coleman 2000, 207). The term ‘partnership’ has gen-
erally been used to describe a profit-oriented relationship between individuals, but in
recent years gained prominence as a more general idea of relations between various ac-
tors. It covers greatly differing concepts and practices and is used to describe a wide va-
riety of types of relationship. Underlying the trend of business to engage in partnerships
with NGOs is a change in attitude and strategy in the corporate sector over the last
twenty years. As Falkner reflects on this change:
“In the 1970s and early 1980s, corporate responses to the environmental
agenda were largely hostile and consisted of little more than reluctant ad-
aptation. While many companies continue to react in similar fashion, the
1980s saw the emergence of new responses based on proactive and sys-
temic integration of environmental goals into corporate strategy. (...) Cor-
porate leaders embraced the notion that corporate environmentalism can
promote ‘win-win’ solutions that further business and environmental inter-
ests” (Falkner 2003, 81).
Besides this trend there are, however, two concrete events that are generally believed to
have triggered the strategy of business actors to engage in partnerships with NGOs,
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namely the public debate about Shell’s involvement in the Ogoni case in southern Nige-
ria and the intended disposal of the Brent Spar off-shore oil rig in the open sea (Pattberg
2003). After widespread public protest and consumer boycott, Shell’s Chief Executive
Officer Herkstroter highlighted the positive aspects of the Greenpeace campaign, and a
partnership approach in general: “We took decisions, which in retrospect were mistakes.
We now realise that alone we could never have hoped to reach the right approach. (...) In
essence, we were somewhat slow in understanding that environmental groups and so on
were tending to acquire authority” (Heap 2000, 3). Protests against brand-name retailers
are only about 10 years old, but as a Greenpeace activist once expressed, “it was like
discovering gunpowder for environmentalists”. Subsequently, after the consumer boycott
against Shell, it became clear that, under certain circumstances, the ‘naming and sham-
ing’ of environmental harmful businesses in public campaigns can provide a powerful
tool for NGOs to impose pressure on business actors. The co-operation of NGOs and
businesses in partnerships could therefore be seen as an attempt to avoid these situations
and develop ‘win-win’ solutions. The MSC has been kick-started by a partnership be-
tween Unilever and the WWF and became an independent, global, non-profit organisa-
tion in 1999.
In sum, there are four important aspects of partnerships in the context of global environ-
mental governance that have to be highlighted: (1) partnerships have shared goals that are
beyond profit making, thus excluding purely marked co-ordinated relations or other pri-
vate interactions to maximise profit; (2) partnerships can involve actors from different
sectors of society; (3) they have institutionalised relationships; (4) partnerships engage in
rule-making and/or implementation, facilitating outcomes that would not be possible in
absence of the specific partnership (Pattberg 2003).
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3 The Environmental Problem
Over time, parts of the ocean have become a commons – an area where owners agree to
rules of use. The twelve nautical mile limit from shore is an example of this, where inter-
national law recognises that countries have authority over activities, such as fishing, that
take place in their territorial seas. Most countries extended their jurisdiction to 200 nauti-
cal miles between the 1960’s and 1980’s, which under the United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention is recognised as a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Countries may
regulate activity within this area; however, they are not allowed to exclude the vessels of
other countries. Areas outside the 200-mile zones of coastal states, the high seas, are re-
garded as a global commons where all nations have legal access. Natural resources
within a commons have become known as common pool resources. These resource areas
have multiple users who are legally defined and difficult to exclude. The fishermen all
live on the premise of the resource that once it is taken it is not available to others (Buck
1998).
This chapter highlights the precarious state of fisheries in the world and how humans are
the agents of unsustainable fishing. A consideration of fisheries management theory is
given, emphasising some of the various tools employed and how fisheries governance
has generally failed to deal with the problems encapsulated with this natural resource.
Through looking at three regulatory approaches within the practice of fisheries manage-
ment - hierarchical, market and participatory - this chapter argues that a balance of all
three approaches is needed. Economics does have a part to play in fisheries management
and eco-labelling is one such tool in its box. An analysis of eco-labelling and how it
works, introduces the Marine Stewardship Council and its market based approach to
sustainable fishing. The basis for this approach is the MSC’s Principles and Criteria by
which fisheries must adhere to. Finally, the chapter asks whether the Marine Stewardship
Council and its market approach can achieve what it has set out to do?
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3.1 A Natural Resource in Danger
It was once thought that the oceans were an inexhaustible mine full of fish stocks that
could be harvested without too much thought. Alfred Marshall summed up the scepticism
as to the nature of fish stocks in 1920:
“As to the sea…its volume is vast and fish are very prolific; and some
think that a practically unlimited supply can be drawn from the sea by man
without appreciably affecting the numbers that remain there; or in other
words, that the law of diminishing returns scarcely applies at all to sea-
fisheries: while others think that experience shows a falling off in the pro-
ductiveness of those fisheries that have been vigorously worked” (Mar-
shall, 1920, Book IV, Ch.III, para 7, quoted in Kooiman et al. 1999).
The developments of humanity in the twentieth century soon put pay to this notion as
fishery after fishery experienced a decline in stocks. In some cases traditional fisheries,
most spectacularly the Atlantic cod fishery on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, have
completely collapsed (Kaye 2001). The insight that fish were prone to overfishing oc-
curred to man back in the Middle Ages, yet in the case of offshore fisheries, regulation
did not come into place until a few decades ago.
The exploitation of fish has many ecological consequences, the results of which are not
only in the direct removal of the target animals. Disturbance can also be caused to the
composition, abundance, and population structure of the target species and other species
as well in the consideration of the overall structure and function of the ecosystem. As
most fisheries consist of mixed stocks this is particularly important. Mixed groups are
groups of species that are caught together but may not have the same abundance, growth
rates, or life histories. Fishery biologists are now urging the use of the ecosystem ap-
proach14 rather than viewing the fish as single species units in isolation (Ludicello,
Weber, & Wieland 1999).
                                                
14 The ecosystem approach acknowledges that the fishers are an integral part of the ecosystem and that both
ecosystem and human well-being must be achieved. Thus, sustainable use of the world’s living aquatic
resources can only be achieved if both the impacts on the ecosystem are identified and, as far as possible,
understood. Within fisheries management the single species approach is widely used which is consider
inadequate (FAO 2000).
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In this regard bycatch is an inherent problem in fisheries. Bycatch describes living crea-
tures that are caught unintentionally by fishing gear. Unlike those species specifically
targeted, bycatch is usually unwanted and unused and is usually thrown back into the
water; however, handling and exposure can sometimes cause injury to the bycatch lead-
ing to possible death after being discarded. Although this discard may serve as food for
other species when it is thrown back, it is not recruited into, and does not become a part
of, the reproducing population. As a result, discard not only affects the current popula-
tion, but also influences the species’ opportunity to replenish itself. “For decades, by-
catches were mostly ignored by scientists working on stock assessment, by fisheries
managers, and by environmentalists…the emphasis on single species management mod-
els and schemes did not leave much room for consideration” (Hall, Alverson & Metuzals
2000).
It is also a problem in terms of what species is actually caught. Some species have a pro-
tection status either under the Endangered Species Act or that of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act relating specifically to bycatch. Environmental groups often contend the
catches of some fisheries, if they contravene these acts, especially when sea mammals,
turtles and birds are the species being caught. This has helped highlight the consequences
of fishing and ultimately bycatch (Alverson 1992). What is required are reliable statistics
that take into account bycatch and inherently leads to something being done about it, for
endangered species and the waste of fish are not the only problems. In those areas where
fisheries overlap, conflicts can often arise due to the problem of bycatch especially when
one fishery discards fish that is important to another. According to Murawski (1992)
“Bycatch interactions have been and remain almost the most frustrating,
difficult, and time-consuming problems faced in fisheries management ar-
eas throughout the world. Although bycatch has always been an integral
part of fishing with non-discriminative gear, efforts to manage bycatch ef-
fectively have intensified” (Alverson, D.L.; Freeberg, M.H.; Pope, J.G.;
Murawski, S.A., 1992).
The highly controversial problem of bycatch has been tackled from the perspective of
producing selective techniques for catching certain species and not others. This will help
to alleviate the problem in some way, however extensive research is needed in this area
and better available information about the actual impacts. Altogether, it requires coop-
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eration from all sectors of the fishing industry, and it is definitely a point that the MSC
could help the fishing industry tackle as will be shown in the case studies.
Another impact of fishing relates to the physical destruction and disturbance to aquatic
ecosystems. Some fishing methods, particularly those that are in contact with the surface
of the seabed such as bottom trawlers can cause adverse destruction and disturbance.
This has to be minimised for it is not keeping with the ecosystem approach to capture
fisheries management.
Overall, the impacts of fishing upon the ecosystem are not widely known to any consid-
erable degree and more research is needed in this area. The ecosystem approach is re-
flected in the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and is beginning to be
adopted by fisheries management. The MSC through their Principles and Criteria can
further influence the use of the ecosystem approach in fisheries management and there-
fore hopefully contribute to sustainable fisheries.
3.1.1 Fish Stocks and our Appetite
The cultural ecology of most fisheries revolves around their ability to sustain constant
harvesting. In those fisheries where industrial methods are not used, there is rarely suffi-
cient impact upon the populations to prevent them from reproducing and growing to
adult size. The advent of industrial technology (steam powered trawler and net winch in
the late 19th century and after World War II, nylon nets and electronic aids to the location
of shoals of fish) had a dramatic effect on this balance (Cushing 1988). Consequently,
there is urgent need for fisheries research because of the diminishing availability of fish
as some species become commercially extinct (Finlayson 1994). There are various other
reasons for urgency – provision of the world’s population, profitability, employment,
community survival, and institutional credibility (King et al 2000).
The seas in the twentieth century sustained humankind as never before. With new tech-
nologies and cheaper energy, bountiful catches were possible. These catches involved
routine over-fishing, which no management regime could stop. Nation states and inter-
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national bodies to try alleviating the pressure on fish stocks, so that sustainable harvest-
ing is possible, have employed numerous policies with differing tools. Although they
have had marginal success in some areas, fisheries remain in crisis worldwide (Garcia
and Newton 1997; Ludicello, Weber and Wieland 1999).
Currently, two thirds of the total food fish supply is obtained from fishing in marine and
inland waters, with the remainder derived from aquaculture.15 The total amount of fish
consumed and the species composition of the food supply vary according to region and
country, reflecting the different levels of natural availability of aquatic resources in adja-
cent waters, as well as diverse food traditions, tastes, demand and income levels (FAO
2002). Global production is currently however, the highest on record and remains very
significant for global food security. Fish, crustaceans and molluscs provided 15.8 percent
of total animal protein intake in 1999. In 2000, an estimated 89 million tonnes of fish was
produced in the world, excluding China16, of which 71 percent (63 million tonnes) was
used for human consumption. The remainder (29 percent) was utilised for various non-
food products, mostly for reduction to meat and oil (FAO 2002). It is definitely true to
say that marine fish populations are never accurately accounted for, because fish are so
hard to count. Landings can be counted, but whether these fluctuations correspond to
changes in fish stocks, and whether changes in fish stocks are the consequences of fish-
ing, is often hard to say. This information conundrum exacerbates the management co-
nundrum of an open access resource.
3.1.2 The Need for reliable statistics
There is consensus among fishery experts that the management of capture fisheries in-
volve synthesising information, analysing, and decision- making (FAO 2002, 59). The
                                                
15 Aquaculture refers to the management and use of water environments for the raising and harvesting of
plant and animal food, in which fish and shellfish are reared in enclosed ponds, tanks and cages, or on
protected beds. It is almost exclusively confined to inland waters and estuarine or other near-shore coastal
waters. The raising of freshwater or marine fish for commercial purposes is often separately classed as fish
farming. With some crustacea, for example shrimps, and in salmon fish farming it is necessary to catch
wild stock to raise to commercial standards in pens (Collins Dictionary of Environmental Science, 1990).
16 China remains by far the largest producer, however, there remain doubts concerning the production sta-
tistics for capture and aquaculture. Therefore because of its importance and uncertainty it is usually dis-
cussed separately from the rest of the world.
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essential ingredient is reliable information so that founded decisions can be made, a more
realistic status of a fishery can be determined and consequently, the effects of a particu-
larly management strategy evaluated fairly.
In order for effective fisheries management it is imperative to know what is actually be-
ing fished from the wild population. This is because it affects the stock’s ability to sur-
vive, and most importantly reproduce and repopulate. Thus, catch and effort statistics
together with other data regarding the fish caught are the essential basis. Specifically, the
statistics taken concern how much fish may be taken, by whom, by what means, when
and where, ensuring that fishers are constrained within the set limits.
“Thus, total allowable catch17 and licence or quota allocation, fishing gear
and operational controls, as well as seasonal and area closures, all require
monitoring, much of which can only be achieved by the regular and sys-
tematic collection or reliable statistics on the catch and amount of fishing
effort” (FAO 2003, 60).
Another reason why reliable statistics are a necessity is because good fisheries manage-
ment in the sense of sustainability18 not only protects the ecological aspect of the fish
stock but also takes care of the dependent communities. These communities depend on
the fisheries for food security and economic well-being. Benefits from the surplus pro-
duction of wild stocks should be brought into economies in ways that are appropriate to
the political, social and development environments in which they occur. This allows
communities to achieve and ensure a fair and appropriate distribution of benefits, while
policy makers need such statistics in order to properly represent the fishing industry
when policies are being developed.
                                                
17 The general definition for Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is the quantity of fish that can be taken from
each stock each year. In the European Union for example, the figure is agreed by the Fisheries Council of
Ministers each December for the following year. EU Member States are then allocated a fixed proportion
of the total allowable catch as their national quota (EEA, 2004).
18 Sustainable, productive fisheries are achieved when appropriate management ensures a high probability
of stocks being able to replenish themselves over a long period of time within a sound ecosystem, while
offering stable economic and social conditions for all those involved in the fishing activity. This definition
is based around that set out in the MSC Standard and what is generally agreed to be the basic fundamen-
tals.
THE MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF A
PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
43
Within fishery statistics there is a prevalent problem of unreliability, which comes from a
variety of sources. A key problem cited by most fishery managers is deliberate misre-
porting or non-reporting by legal and illegal fishers and other participants (processors,
traders) particularly in developing countries and international fisheries. Within small-
scale fisheries and developing country fisheries a common problem is the lack of law
requiring fishery data, and/or very little infrastructure for the collection of such data.
Furthermore, the data that is collected may be based on inadequate sampling or inappro-
priate sampling methods (FAO 2002). The MSC could help to alleviate these problems in
the future by encouraging fisheries to utilise the more sustainable methods and helping to
produce more open, reliable statistics by providing the resources to do so.
Other problems include bias and deliberately distorting the numbers to come into line
with a particular outcome, delays in the preparation of statistics rendering their useful-
ness, as well as the appropriate confidentiality of fishery data. Combined with the fact
that some of the data collected are of little relevance in terms of fisheries management,
culminates to produce a management headache. A greater uncertainty into the stock as-
sessment process undoubtedly leads to a reduction in confidence of the accuracy of fish-
eries management advice. Consequently this often leads to conflict among fisheries man-
agers being overcautious, fishers who think they know better and anxious environmental
campaigners (Harnesson 1996).
3.1.3 Fish stocks and their precarious status
Despite questioning the reliability of data there is a persistent pattern concealed by the
mean totals for each year that highlights the delicate nature of this resource. Numerous
important fisheries collapsed in the twentieth century, generally the most valuable ones,
due to the power of demand in their markets, or planned production quotas, and tech-
nologies. Examples of those that crashed are the cod fisheries of Newfoundland's Grand
Banks. By July 1992 it was reported that the northern cod populations had declined to the
point that they were on the verge of commercial extinction. This was the basis for the
moratorium on the entire northern cod fishery. Some 35,000 fishers and fish-plant work-
ers were affected by this closure, not to mention the other businesses, families, and
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community organizations dependent on the work of fishermen and plant workers (McCay
and Finlayson 1995). The North Atlantic cod moratorium remains in effect to this day.
There is little evidence that cod populations, or other depleted populations in the North
Atlantic, will be able to sustain a resumption of fishing anytime soon. Other examples
include the redfish, and haddock fish stocks, which have all but collapsed in some areas
of the North Atlantic. This prompted the World Conservation Union in 1996 to add sev-
eral commercial fish species - including Atlantic cod, haddock, and bluefin tuna - to its
influential "red list" of species whose survival is in some degree endangered (Hudson &
Mace 1996).
Wherever modern fishing methods were applied, sooner or later high fishing pressure,
combined with a natural downturn in fish stocks, led to a crash (FAO 1997). The catches
of the 1980’s and 1990’s show a greater proportion of previously uneconomic fish
(“trash fish”) sought out because cod, herring, haddock and tuna, among others, became
harder to find (King & Durrenberger 2000).
The collapses in these decades were not new. Regulation to prevent fishing can be traced
back as far as the thirteenth century and in 1869 the first treaty was signed between Brit-
ain and France in order to curtail over-fishing. This paved the way for a series of bilateral
and multilateral agreements to come into force (a selection of which are in List 3.1). The
list highlights that varying management techniques were used for the conservation of fish
stocks and therefore suggesting the complexity of fisheries and that there is no one easy
way to manage them (see Table 3.1). These techniques included closed seasons and area
(reserves) restrictions on the type of gear allowed, and quotas. For example, the Rhine
convention (1885) set out minimum mesh size, gear restrictions and closed seasons. Free-
rider ship was ruled out, for if one party denounced the terms the others would follow
suit (Wolf 1997, 61).
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Table 4:  List of selected International Fisheries Agreements. (Source: Wolf 1997)
1. 1867 Convention between France and Great Britain Relative to Fisheries
2. 1885 Convention between Baden, Bavaria, Hessen, Netherlands, Oldenburg, Prus-
sia, Switzerland, and Wuertenberg for the Uniform Regulation of Fishing in
the Rhine.
3. 1930
1985
Convention between the USA and Canada for the Protection, Preservation,
and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries of the Fraser River System
Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon
4. 1937 Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of fishing, Nets and the Size
Limits of Fish
5. 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas
6. 1981 Agreement on Fisheries between the European Economic Community and
Canada.
7. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part 5
8. 1994 Agreement on Fisheries between The EEC and Denmark/ Greenland
9. 1995 Agreement Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
In 1897 the first use of a direct quota was witnessed between Russia and Swe-
den/Norway. The Convention was based upon allocated shares in order to regulate the
Salmon Fishery in the Tornea. Each party had half the fishery and fishing was carried out
by cooperatives. Equality of fish stocks was maintained by transferring fish. Although in
this case there was no limit in place to regulate the total harvest, it is believed that the
cooperatives operation may have had an indirect bearing on the total harvests collected
(Wolf 1997, 61).
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Table 5:  Management Techniques of the selected International Fisheries Agreements.
  (Source Wolf 1997)
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In the 1960’s and 1970’s most countries expanded their fisheries zones from 12 to 200
nautical miles19. Many of the bilateral and multilateral agreements needed updating to
accommodate the expansion of the fisheries zones. A number of international fishery
agreements with established management commissions also needed reforming. Many of
these treaties share a number of similarities due to many of the nations involved in the
same agreements, and also in part because the United Nations Food and Agriculture Or-
ganisation facilitated the negotiation in many cases. Yet despite the actions of these
commissions since their establishment, and that of the command and control policies
adopted by nation states, almost all of the most valuable fisheries are today seriously
overstressed from a biological standpoint. Not only this but also many fishing communi-
ties are suffering economically (Wolf 1997, 68).
3.2 The Need for Effective Fisheries Governance
Marine fisheries governance and the prospect of improved fisheries management are
gathering pace as fisheries in a growing number of ocean areas come under the scope of
regional fisheries management organisations, and as the international community is
holding these to greater accountability by paying more attention to the problems associ-
ated with fishing.
International Law continues to play an important part within fisheries. The United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) had dramatic effects on the action of the
state within fisheries. Within the framework of this law the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) was adopted, which placed 90 per cent of the world’s fisheries under national ju-
risdiction. The consequences were huge for patterns of fishery exploitation and the own-
ership of fishing vessels (Kaye 2001). Kaye goes on to note that “while the Law of Sea
Convention reflects the dominant paradigm in contemporary marine living resource man-
agement, it is not the only area of international law that has a role to play. The emergence
of the precautionary principle in the 1980’s, and its subsequent adoption at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro
                                                
19 One nautical mile equals 1.15 stature (land) miles.
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1992, and its acceptance within the Highly Migratory and Straddling Stocks Agreement
presents a distinct alternative to the management of fisheries” (Kaye 2001, 2).
The nation states are those that signed the declaration of these laws and considerable
power is with them to manage fisheries in a responsible manner. Nonetheless, the inter-
national community places particular importance and responsibility into the hands of
sub-regional and regional fisheries cooperation. The reason for this is because many fish
stocks are transboundary in nature and cannot be managed by single state actors (FAO
2000, 48). The FAO concludes that the issue for Regional Fishery Management Organi-
sations is their capacity and willingness to accommodate new entrants in a fair and con-
sistent manner. “RFMOs are needed to facilitate and reinforce regional cooperation. Over
the next decade, RFMOs face the challenge of implementing parts of Agenda 21, the
1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible
fisheries. However, unless RFMO members cooperate more closely and are prepared to
take difficult decisions, which could have adverse short term social and economic costs
on their way to achieving longer-term sustainability gains, even large amounts of scien-
tific research, funding and enforcement will not improve the effectiveness of these or-
ganisations” (FAO 2000, 49).
Therefore, what is needed for better fisheries regulation? This section shows that fisher-
ies are part of a diverse, dynamic and complex social and economic sector. As a resource,
fish is in great danger and therefore the livelihoods and way of life of those fishers,
families and communities that depend on fish. Traditional fisheries regulation has failed
to turn the tide of unsustainable fisheries. According to Kooiman, van Vliet and Jentoft a
new perspective on regulation is needed, on the basis of which new opportunities can be
sought. Their basic assumption and normative belief is
“that in modern societies there is a growing need for ‘co’ tasks and respon-
sibilities, in addition to the specific relevance and the need for separate
public and private tasks and responsibilities. In societal sectors such as
fisheries, there is a growing need to look upon problem solving or oppor-
tunity-creation in terms of a ‘mix’ of self-governing, co-governing and hi-
erarchical governing. Every problem and every opportunity needs a spe-
cific mix of these three governing types.” (Kooiman et al. 1999, 6).
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Consequently, this requires a multi-faceted approach and/or interdisciplinary co-
operation, whereby interaction takes centre stage. Fisheries are marked by a diversity of
involved interests: there are small and large-scale fishermen; community versus corpo-
rate interests; fishing and ecological issues. Thus, fisheries are complex in which the
density of the linkages and interactions between actors and entities within fisheries is
ever increasing. The outcome of these characteristics is a sector where:
? Problems occur as the result of an interplay of various factors, some of which are
clearly known, but others are easily overlooked;
? Knowledge about causes and solutions is dispersed over many actors;
? Uncertainty is the rule, not the exception (Kooiman et al. 1999, 14).
Therefore, in which ways can fisheries management find solutions to these governance
problems? There is a need to develop new techniques, new instruments and new institu-
tional arrangements. The Marine Stewardship Council is adequately poised to help rec-
tify some of the problems just mentioned by complementing already existing fisheries
regulation and being a fresh approach to the management of fisheries.
There are three perspectives of regulation that dominate the theory and practice of fish-
eries management. These are hierarchical governance; market governance; and partici-
patory governance.
3.2.1 Hierarchical governance
This is most regularly applied and is where government is held responsible for an ade-
quate management of the fishery. Through applying legal and administrative powers,
government can enforce rules and regulations in order to manage the sector. A prime
example is the use of legal and administrative measures that decide when, how and
where fishing is allowed to take place (Kooiman et al. 1999).
The hierarchical system has come under severe criticisms and some argue that it is
deemed to be outdated and inadequate. The powers of government to regulate society are
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constrained by the obligation to legitimise its actions. Factors that are believed to be re-
sponsible for the failures of public policy are:
? Lack of knowledge, time and financial resources within the public service, espe-
cially on the part of enforcers.
? The power of social groups, especially business, to influence public decision-
making or to resist government pressure.
? The complexity of the issue at stake, which encumbers or even prevents the de-
sign of adequate regulatory devices (Kooiman et al. 1999).
It is the implementation of fisheries rules that results in incomplete enforcement because
of mutual dependence and limited resources due to the multi-actor interactive process,
strategic behaviour with bargaining among key actors and the interaction of interest mo-
tivated actors under constraints (Downing & Hanf 1983).
3.2.2 Market governance
This is one alternative to hierarchical governance in which the government is persuaded
to make use of the market mechanism through creating markets or market conditions.
The individual transferable quota (ITQ) system is a prime example within fisheries. The
total allowable catch is divided into private property rights, which can be freely traded.
The profit orientation and cost-consciousness of individual fishermen will result in the
most efficient way of harvesting the fish for the society as a whole (Squires et al. 1995).
According to advocates of market governance, the government should try to change the
incentive structure to reconcile private and public interest, and restore the workings of a
perfect market. ITQs could solve the biological, economic and administrative tasks of the
fisheries, especially if they are evolved towards real property rights, as this will allow
individuals to act as private owners of a resource (who are supposed to have an interest in
the conservation of the stock) (Kooiman et al, 1999).
THE MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF A
PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
51
3.2.3 Participatory governance
This is the second alternative and it advocates that government should not try to regulate
fisheries alone, as one institution cannot have enough knowledge, legitimacy and power
to regulate fisheries in an adequate way. Some responsibility for collective action prob-
lem solving should be transferred to user-groups and /or other stakeholders, so that dis-
persed knowledge and governing capacities can be united (Kooiman et al. 1999).
The idea that meso and micro levels of society should participate more in governing on a
significant level is central to this perspective. It involves rearranging the organisational
structure of governance and a changing of attitude among the participants. Advantages of
this perspective over hierarchical governance are centred on its adaptability. By involv-
ing the meso and micro levels it is believed to be more flexible to the complexity of gov-
ernance in modern society. Moreover it is less legalistic and it can be assumed that par-
ticipation will boost the legitimacy of government (Ostrom 1990).
In consideration of these three governance procedures the Marine Stewardship Council is
very much a market regulation as will be outlined in the next section. Furthermore it has
participatory incentives embedded within the programme. In sum it is a mixture of the
alternatives to hierarchical regulation, which is there to compliment governmental regu-
lation.
3.3 Economics and Fishing
Economics is the study of the allocation of scarce resources.20 If the amount of a good
that one-person uses does not affect what is left for everyone else, it is regarded as free
(as opposed to scarce). In many cases, there is unrestricted access to a resource and no
one is charged a fee or is otherwise limited in taking it. Economists refer to such re-
sources as open access resources (Ludicello, Weber and Weiland 1999). As no one owns
                                                
20 By resources we mean things that people use. In economics, a resource described as limited or scarce is
scarce in relation to wants. Fish are sometimes scarce and sometimes not. Farm-raised fish are scarce,
however, marine fish have not historically been treated as a scarce resource.
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the oceans it has traditionally been open access to all comers. Open access refers to the
fact that anyone can fish in the area designated. It is an attempt to be fair and to share the
opportunity of fishing, however, it is too often the case that an open access fishery will
attract too many boats and people, too much fishing power, resulting in an over fished
fishery. In economic terms a fisherman will strive to maximise profits by combining his
effort21 where there is the greatest excess of revenues over cost. As long as the return
from the catch exceeds the cost of the inputs the fisherman will continue to apply the
effort. The problem in an open access fishery is that no one places any limit on how
much fishing effort is applied. The result is that fishing effort increases until there is no
more profit to be made. It is at this point that too much effort is being expended in chas-
ing too few fish.
Pure open access, as alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, has been modified over
time. From the 1960’s the onset of national fisheries jurisdiction and the evolution of
fishery management has created a present situation that has been described by Wilen and
Homans (1997) as regulated open access in which controls or regulations are combined
with limits on access to the fishery (Ludicello et al. 1999). Sissenwine and Rosenberg in
their 1993 paper ‘Marine fisheries at a critical junction’ clarified the situation in their
views that restrictions can only protect the stock for a while. If access remains open,
catch limits and rules alone will not be enough to discourage new entrants from seeking
rents in the fishery. They concluded that management which ignores the economic in-
centives and the importance of rights to fish tends to exacerbate the problem instead of
averting it (Sissenwine and Rosenberg 1993). The following section delves into some
examples of economic incentives and property right in fisheries.
As explained, fishermen in an open access fishery continue applying effort until the re-
turn on a unit of effort exceeds its cost. What if the fishery belonged to a single owner
where ownership prevented others from fishing in the fishery? This exclusion would
leave the fisherman not needing to worry about leaving fish for others to catch and would
                                                
21   Fishing effort is often expressed as “number of days fished” or as size of vessel, such as gross tonnage.
Due to the constantly changing state of fishing technology these measures represent an imperfect estimate
of changes in fishery capacity. In this example effort refers to the vessel, gear, labour, fuel, and time on the
fishing grounds.
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have an incentive to not use more fuel, gear, and labour than necessary. Furthermore, the
fisherman would then be concerned about the number of fish caught today as well as in
the future.
This simplified scenario illustrates that by changing the fundamental assumption of hav-
ing one fisherman instead of many self-interested fishermen, the catch outcome can
change. It states simply the best case for an economically efficient fishery – the profit
maximising outcome. However, in the real world this situation does not exist anymore
than does a completely unregulated open access regime. Today’s fisheries operate under
a combination of regulated open access, or controlled access in combination with regula-
tions (Ludicello et al. 1999).
3.3.1 Examples of Economic Instruments
Over the past several decades governments have played conflicting roles in marine fish-
eries. Firstly they have sought to secure food supplies, to increase employment, and to
promote economic development through increasing the capacity of their fishing fleets
and processing units. Yet on the other side their role has been to try and protect society’s
interests by controlling fishing fleets from depleting public fishery resources (Ludicello
et al. 1999) Economic instruments and regulations have played an important part in these
outcomes.
Governments have promoted social objectives through economic assistance and in fish-
eries this has been mainly through the use of subsidies. According to Roodman (1996) a
subsidy can be defined as a government policy that alters market risks, rewards, and costs
in ways that favour certain activities or groups (Roodman 1996). This definition inter-
prets subsidies to not only include tax breaks or grants but also government policies that
might involve research and development or marketing. In general, there is agreement that
fisheries subsidies do great harm by exacerbating the problems arising from the 'common
pool' aspects of capture fisheries (Cox 2001). However, many economists believe that, if
the 'common pool' aspects of a fishery could be removed by, for example, establishing a
full-fledged property rights system, the negative impact of fisheries subsidies would
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prove to be trivial (Munro & Sumaila 2002).
Other economic instruments rely more on the market than regulatory intervention to
regulate fishing capacity. The individual transferable quota (ITQ) is the most commonly
used market-based mechanism and represents a form of rights-based management. In
theory, a properly designed rights-based management program will create economic in-
centives for vessel owners to decrease their labour and capital investments in a fishery,
resulting in a reduction in fishing capacity (Squires, Kirkley and Tisdell 1995).
ITQ programs have generated substantial concerns. Most notably there is an abiding fear
among some fishermen that the character of the commercial fishing industry and small
fishing communities will be sacrificed or lost, particularly if ITQs result in large corpo-
rations or other absentee owners controlling the industry with focused interest in market
share rather than on the resource and the people (Squires et al. 1995).
Some of the criticisms levelled at ITQ programs are common to all fishery management,
and care should be taken to judge ITQ programs by appropriate measures, such as differ-
ences from the fishery under open access. Commercial fishing is very complex. ITQs
must not be seen as providing the final or sole solution to fishery management concerns,
but are only one tool to be used in conjunction with more traditional fishery management
options. ITQs alone can address only some of the present concerns (e.g., ITQs alone will
not bring about restoration of any fishery, because ITQs do not address habitat quality
and other environmental issues).
3.3.2 Ecolabelling: a new tool in Fisheries
The previous section highlighted just a few of the economic tools used within fisheries
management, which have worked in order to try and manage fishing capacity. Moreover,
the section highlighted just how economics can play a role in the management of fisher-
ies. Since 1997 the Marine Stewardship Council has been working to create more sus-
tainable fisheries through the use of another market-based incentive – that of a certifica-
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tion program and ecolabelling22. This section explores how this market based incentive
works and what role it can play within the area of fishing for a sustainable future.
“Between 1950 and 2000 world catch of wild fish for human consumption increased
from 20 to 95 million tonnes. As demand for seafood has risen there has been a race to
increasingly exploit known fish stocks and to find and develop new stocks” (Mcllgorm
1999). Poor management around the world of fisheries is leading to a decrease in fish
stocks. The concern over the status of fish stocks, combined with well-known limitations
of command and control management mechanism (Hannesson 1996) has led to initiatives
to provide consumers with more information regarding the production process of seafood
products. One such initiative of providing consumers with such information on the pro-
duction process of seafood is to use certification and eco-labelling programs.
One definition of ecolabelling is that of the OECD in which they are described as “vol-
untary granting of labels by a private or public body in order to inform consumers and
thereby promote consumer products which are determined to be environmentally more
friendly than other functionally and competitively similar products” (FAO, 2000). Ecola-
belling as a market-based incentive seeks to persuade customer’s behaviour so that they
take into consideration purchasing attributes such as social environmental and ecological
aspects and not just price. The label is present to notify customers of these attributes,
without requiring the customer to delve too deeply into the complications of that underlie
the certification criteria and the certification itself (FAO, 2000).
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that perfect information is required for efficient
operation of economic markets. Therefore, consumers must have access to all the rele-
vant information in order to make economically rational decisions. This, however, is not
                                                
22 Certification conveys acceptance into an ecolabelling program of a product, which is in compliance with
relevant criteria, and other requirements of the program. If the criteria are met and an agreement between
the product supplier and the ecolabelling program is entered into, the product supplier's complying product
may be represented as certified; Ecolabel refers to an ecolabelling program's graphic emblem or seal,
which is used on or in association with a product to acknowledge that product's compliance with relevant
certification criteria (Wessels et al. 2001).
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the case in reality as there are several types of imperfections related to the information
that individual consumers receive. The most significant of these are the following: -
? That individuals may not have sufficient information with which to base their de-
cisions on;
? That individuals may not know the limitations of the information they receive;
? Or, that they do not have the knowledge needed to evaluate the information.
Environmental certification programs offer one market-orientated approach to addressing
each of the three types of information deficits noted above. In theory, such labelling pro-
grams affect consumer behaviour as follows:
1) An independent third party first develops criteria for environmentally preferable
products by category, and then evaluates products to determine their absolute and
relative (to other products within the same product category) environmental bur-
dens during manufacture, use, and disposal.
2) This complex information is presented in simplified form on a product label.
3) Consumers can then incorporate the environmental attributes as present on the
label with conventional attributes, such as price, quality, and convenience, to
evaluate the products. To the extent that consumer demand for products with
fewer environmental burdens exists, the market share of these products will in-
crease, all else being equal.
4) In response, companies manufacturing competing, but less environmentally pref-
erable, products may reformulate their products as a competitive strategy. Manu-
facturers may also, for reasons unrelated to consumer demand (such as employee
or stockholder relations) seek out an environmental label to distinguish them-
selves within the marketplace. (EPA 1994)
The success of labelling programs depends on several factors that are not directly related
to the format, content, or procedures of product labelling. Consumers’ behaviour to envi-
ronmental messages and information is directly related to how much they understand
about environmental issues. Furthermore, labelling initiatives include a significant edu-
cational and promotional effort. Such an effort can include nationwide publicity cam-
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paigns and the creation of environmental curricula for use in schools, supplementary
material upon request and available material at the point of purchase.
Within these certification (eco-label) programmes the underlying economic theory can be
found within Stigler’s work on the economics of information.
“A consumer searches for information until the marginal benefit of addi-
tional information is equal to the marginal cost of obtaining the additional
information. As a result, there is a willingness to pay for information (or
demand curve), and there is a marginal cost of information (or supply
curve)” (Stigler 1961, 213-225).
This work was contended by Nelson (1970, 1974) who stated that determining quality
levels in the market is an even greater problem than that of determining price levels, be-
cause it is harder usually to obtain information about quality compared to information on
prices. Nelson distinguished between search goods and experience goods. The quality of
search goods might be defined as price, size of package, or colour, whereas the quality of
experience goods may be determined by experience of taste, durability, or maintenance
needs. In 1973, Darby and Karni expanded this by including credence goods. These are
goods that you cannot determine the quality of by going either through search or experi-
ence, such as the production process of a good. It is for these goods that one must rely on
a third party to provide truthful information to the consumer whether the product is of
high quality or not (Wessels 2001). Government regulations or a third party certification
process may carry this out.
The success of the products depends very much on how the producer advertises them and
the acceptance of the producers’ claims to the consumers’. For search and experience
goods, the producers may advertise information about the lowest prices and highest
quality. For credence goods the situation is more complex for the consumers cannot de-
termine the product’s quality even after they buy and consume it (Darby et al. 1973).
Therefore, an imperfect market exists because to start with there is unevenness in posses-
sion of knowledge between the producer and consumer, and furthermore, because it is
not practical for consumers’ to assess the quality of the product. For example, the envi-
ronmental friendliness of a good is an attribute of credence goods since it is in general
infeasible for the consumer to observe the production process. “According to Caswell
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(1998), labelling can transform credence attributes to search attributes that allow the con-
sumer to judge quality of the good before they purchase it” (Roheim 2002).
In the case of seafood products the most important certification scheme is that of the Ma-
rine Stewardship Council (MSC). It was in early 1996, that the World Wide Fund for
Nature (WWF) and the multinational giant, Unilever, announced their joint commitment
to establish the MSC to design and implement market-driven incentives for sustainable
fishing. The world’s largest private, non-profit conservation organisation seeks a new
approach to ensure more effective management of marine fisheries. Unilever, who are on
the other hand a major buyer of frozen fish and manufacturer of the world’s best-known
frozen fish products, are interested in long-term fish stock sustainability to ensure a fu-
ture for its successful fish business. The MSC’s market based approach is designed to
complement regulation. By bridging the gap between business and environment, which is
done by working through a multi-stakeholder approach that focuses on integration and
support from the fishing industry, wholesalers, processors, retailers, conservationists,
scientists, environmental organisations and consumers (MSC, June 2003).
The MSC works toward sustainable marine fisheries by promoting responsible, environ-
mentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable fisheries practices,
while maintaining the biodiversity, productivity and ecological processes of the marine
environment, through three principles:
1) A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing or de-
pletion of the exploited population and, for those populations that are depleted;
the fishery must be conducted in a manner that demonstrably leads to their recov-
ery.
2) Fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, productiv-
ity, function and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and associated de-
pendant and ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends.
3) The fishery is subject to an effective management system that respects local, na-
tional and international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and op-
erational frameworks that require use of the resource to be responsible and sus-
tainable (MSC 2003).
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Consumer access to the product is key to the effectiveness of the eco-label. Currently,
there are more than 200 MSC labelled products on sale in 17 countries – a 30% increase
from last year (MSC 2004). Consumer access is particularly significant in the U.S and
Western Europe where several large retail chains are selling MSC labelled products. For
example, Migros, the first supermarket chain in continental Europe to sell MSC products,
reports that they currently have 27 MSC labelled items in their assortment of products,
with about 6% of the value of all fish sales in 2001. This is approximately a 20% increase
above 2000, increased partly due to several aggressive product promotions of the MSC
product to their consumers, building consumer’s recognition of the logo and the logo’s
meaning (Roheim 2002).
Although only one example has been given of the market impact, there is a healthy
growth in consumer access to MSC-certified products. Many seafood buyers for grocery
corporations have indicated that they look forward to when there is a wider choice of
MSC certified products available so that they can increase the range of offerings to their
customers. Presently, one of the primary difficulties that retailers are face in supporting
the MSC program is the limited availability of MSC labelled products. Many of the fish-
eries that have so far been certified are seasonal in nature; therefore high quality product
is not available during all parts of the year. Thus certification of additional fisheries is
necessary in order to increase availability of product for the market and to help ensure the
effectiveness of the MSC certification program (Roheim 2002).
The implications of increasing the number of certified fisheries could be twofold. More
products and product promotions will increase consumer awareness about the problems
that wild fisheries are facing and what as consumers they can do to help prevent these
problems. Secondly as more fisheries are certified there is hopefully the intended effect
of improving the ocean environment.
At the heart of these certification programs is the consumer. As market based incentives
they are dependent on consumers buying the products. Eco-labelling therefore assumes
that the consumers are informed enough about environmental issues and care enough to
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want to buy environmentally friendly products. The push has to come from all sides in
order to educate the consumers. These include the MSC, the seafood processors, buyers
and distributors and the media. The MSC is there to compliment already existing poli-
cies, not to replace them. A start has been made in the area of fisheries to give consumers
the choice. Ultimately these certification schemes are effective only inasmuch as the is-
sues they represent are important to society. Furthermore, and most importantly they
must reflect broader societal issues.
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4 Case Study - The Marine Stewardship Council
4.1 Introduction to the structure and function of the MSC
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is an example of a private governance mecha-
nism. This kind of governance mechanism results from enhanced co-operation between
former adversaries, namely TNCs and NGOs (Pattberg 2003, 11). In the case of the MSC
the close partnership that formed was between the WWF and the Unilever Group, who in
1996 set about shaping an institution based on the model and experiences of the Forest
Stewardship Council (FSC) in the issue area of fisheries. As a governance mechanism the
MSC is amongst other things involved in standard setting, accrediting certifiers, and
granting labels for products and production chains.
The MSC aims at exerting governance in the area of fishing by working through a multi-
stakeholder approach. It focuses on integration and support from the fishing industry,
wholesalers, processors, retailers, conservationists, scientists, environmental organisa-
tions and consumers (MSC 2003).
The previous chapter provided information about how ecolabels and certification work in
general. This chapter provides specific insight into the Marine Stewardship Council con-
cerning how it was created? What the MSC is trying to do? And how it goes about doing
this?
4.1.1 The Emergence - Motives of the initial Actors (Unilever + WWF)
Based upon the WWF’s experience with the FSC, the NGO was asked to set up a similar
model of stewardship combining exert standard setting with third part certification. After
lengthy discussions with many of the stakeholders involved in the FSC, one partner was
singled out. According to Fowler and Heap, who wrote the book ‘Terms for Endearment’
concerning the task of achieving a better understanding of where the power lies and what
drives NGOs, businesses and the political process, Unilever were identified as an appro-
priate partner because they were beginning to question the sustainability of their actions
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and possessed substantial organisational commitment (Fowler and Heap 2000, 137).
These authors went on to postulate that it was the WWF who instigated the idea and they
alone who decided to cut short the stakeholder involvement short and set up a two party
process. As the MSC's official literature notes, Unilever and the WWF were brought to-
gether by "different motivations, but a shared objective: to ensure the long-term viability
of global fish populations and the health of the marine ecosystems on which they de-
pend" (MSC 1996, 1).
Unilever is an Anglo-Dutch company, created in 1930, which has a foods division and a
home and personal care division. Unilever today has operations in around 100 countries
and products on sale in 150 with a turnover at the end of 2002 of nearly 50,000 million
euros (Unilever 2003). There are various reasons why Unilever was recognised as a po-
tential partner by the WWF. Primarily it was at the time of consideration one of the
leading fish processors and bought 25 per cent of the world’s white fish23 market. Fur-
thermore, Unilever reacted to the emergence of conclusive evidence at the beginning of
the 1990’s that over-fishing had put global stocks of fish for human consumption at seri-
ous risk, by committing to buy all fish from sustainable sources by 2005; a goal that it
already had to postpone due to unforeseen delays in the MSC certification process. As
one of the world’s largest buyer of seafood its supplies to the frozen fish business were
threatened. It started engaging with its fish suppliers to adopt sustainable fishing prac-
tices, and in 1996 asked its suppliers to confirm that their fish were legally caught in
specified United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation catch areas. In addition they
wanted to know whether they were involved in species threatened with extinction, and
for those suppliers who could not offer confirmation they stopped doing business (Unile-
ver 2003, 6). It is important to think about whether corporations such as Unilever really
do have the sustainability of fisheries at the heart of their thinking. As Steinberg ques-
tions, “are private producers truly serious about foregoing short-term profit and incurring
the costs associated with internalization of externalities in order to ensure long-term
sustainability?” (Steinberg 2000) This has led some authors to brand certification pro-
grammes, such as the MSC, as ‘corporate greenwash’ (Kaliner 1997). Although the mo-
                                                
23 White fish is a fisheries term referring to several species of deep water ocean fish, such as cod, whiting
and haddock.
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tivations of the initial actors are an interesting issue to study, it is not one we are inten-
tionally trying to investigate.
The World Wide Fund for Nature (formerly the World Wildlife Fund) was very much the
leader in the FSC, upon which the MSC is modelled. One of the reasons why they chose
to form a partner with only one other actor could possibly be accounted for by the expe-
rience of the setting up of the FSC. In this example a number of conflicts emerged con-
cerning the amount of power given to corporate interests in defining the certification cri-
teria, which eventually led to Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth leaving the council
(Humphreys, 1996). By choosing carefully a partner that had enough market power and
also the right intentions was surely at the forefront of the WWF thinking. In Unilever
they found the largest market player who was already pledging itself to buying all of its
fish from sustainable sources by the year 2005 (Unilever 2003, 1).
In setting up the MSC the two partners each brought a wide range of skills, knowledge
and networks to the formation. In 1999 the MSC became a fully independent non-profit
organisation. The MSC now functions independently from the founding partners, but
they continue to support the initiative through funding and promotional work. The deci-
sion to distance themselves from the MSC was their own decision, according to Roger
Cooke (a partner at Coopers and Lybrand24), and an opportunity for others to work with
them and take the initiative forward. Cooke went on to argue that the Forest Stewardship
Council’s image had born the consequences of becoming more associated with the envi-
ronmental groups than with producers, and that the WWF and Unilever did not want the
MSC initiative to be seen as theirs (McHale 1998).
                                                
24 Coopers and Lybrand are an internationally renowned accounting and consulting firm that was con-
tracted to develop an organisational blueprint for the MSC and advised the WWF/Unilever team on how to
implement the programme (McHale 1998).
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4.1.2 The Organisation Chart of the MSC
The Main Board
The MSC is not structured as a formal membership organisation like the FSC, but is in-
stead governed by a Board of 14 individuals. The Board members are automatically
trustees of the charity and are nominated in a personal capacity for a three-year term,
representing the MSC in public whenever appropriate. The members come from every
continent and they bring with them expertise from a wide range of sectors including sci-
entific, industry, government and conservation (MSC 2003, June). It is important to note
that the appointed board, which has no direct accountability to a body of constituent
member organisations, primarily oversees the decision-making procedures of the MSC
(Steinberg 2000).
In 2001, a ten-month review was finalised into the governance structure of the MSC re-
sponding to stakeholders concerns. The review included extensive consultation across a
broad range of issues with several hundred interested parties. The external panel and two
co-chairmen formulated a series of recommendations which were accepted by the MSC
board at its meeting in June. The following changes were made to the set up:
• MSC Board of Trustees - increased representation to incorporate a diverse bal-
ance of interests and skills especially the conservation area and developing world.
• The MSC Technical Advisory Board - its role includes advising the Board on
matters relating to the MSC Standard, replaces the existing Standards Council.
• The MSC Stakeholder Council - this will replace the Advisory Board and Senior
Advisors Group. A group of about 30 members will act as a point of reference for
the MSC Board, and meet annually. The Stakeholder Council will appoint two
joint chairmen with seats on the MSC board.
• MSC National & Regional Working Groups - these will have further defined
roles.
• MSC Committees - these will be convened on an ad hoc basis (MSC 2001).
This new hierarchy structure, as highlighted in flowchart 1, is intended to create an im-
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portant balance between efficiency and openness, with governance that is hoped to pro-
vide a platform for growth and progress.
Flowchart 1: The MSC Governance Structure of the MSC (Source: MSC 2003)
The Technical Advisory Board
The Technical Advisory Board (TAB) has 11 members who are a mixture of fisheries
scientists, those from processing and marketing, a person from the seafood industry and a
representative of small scale, community based fisheries. Its function is to advise the
Main Board on all relevant matters including the setting and review of the MSC Stan-
dard. The TAB is equipped to form sub committees and/or call in ad hoc skills in order to
focus specific expertise on specific functions or topics. Before a final decision about pro-
posed recommendations is made, the TAB will, where appropriate, gather and consider
the views from the Stakeholder Council’s members and other interest groups. Then the
TAB submits a final recommendation accordingly. The Main Board is strongly guided by
the TAB's advice and it will set out its reasons when reaching a different conclusion to
the TAB. It is the Main Board that is responsible for appointing the TAB, whilst the TAB
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is responsible for its own chair (MSC 2003).
The Stakeholder Council
The Stakeholder Council (StC) has a balanced stakeholder body of 30-50 members ful-
filling specific roles and acting as a point of reference, participation, liaison and repre-
sentation. The annual StC meetings include an open convention event for all interested
parties at which reports from, in person, the Chairman of the Main Board and the MSC
Chief Executive will be presented and discussed. Their reports focus respectively on
MSC strategy and executive activities. The StC has two joint chairs that have seats on the
MSC Main Board and thereby are involved, on behalf of StC members, in all Board
matters, decisions and appointments.
The StC represents a balance of MSC stakeholder constituencies through a defined
structure and procedures. The Board in consultation with the MSC Executive has ap-
pointed half the members. The current members have appointed the remaining half. Each
StC constituency is responsible for its own nominations and appointments. The ability
for the Main Board to nominate and appoint constituency members will remain available
and be exercised when circumstances require (for example when a constituency is unable
to find or agree upon suitable members).
Accreditation Committee
The Accreditation Committee, which was formerly known as the Approvals Committee,
functions as the body that ratifies accreditation decisions made by the MSC. Therefore,
they are the body that makes the decisions concerning whether a certification body be-
comes an accredited MSC certifier, according to the specified requirements as stated in
the MSC Accreditation Manual.
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4.1.3 The Certification Procedure
Certification Methodology
The certification methodology has been written for use by the MSC when accrediting
certification bodies. The aim of the certification methodology is to set out how these
third parties should undertake assessments of organisations against the MSC Principles
and Criteria. Flowchart 2 reveals the pro-
cess for accrediting a Certifier whilst
the following points explicitly express
the methodology:
• To establish a consistent certifica-
tion methodology to enable all MSC
accredited certification bodies to oper-
ate in a consistent and controlled man-
ner.
• Provide the transparency that is
required of an international accredita-
tion body for it to be credible with po-
tential stakeholders, including govern-
ments, fishery managers, certification
bodies, suppliers of fish and fish prod-
ucts, non-governmental organisations
and the general public.
• To provide documentation designed
to assure long-term continuity and con-
sistency of the delivery of MSC certifi-
cation.
• To specify a system that ensures the
MSC Logo on fish or fish products is a credible assurance that the fish is derived
from a well-managed and sustainable fishery, as defined by the MSC Principles and
Criteria and ultimately the MSC claim (MSC 2002).
Flowchart 2: Accreditation procedure
for certifiers. (Source MSC)
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At the last TAB meeting in Seattle, November 2003, progress was made on the develop-
ment of a new Fisheries Certification Methodology, which is currently being reviewed by
the Main Board of Trustees and will be available soon (MSC 2003, 3). By reviewing this
upcoming methodology we hope to evaluate what were the motives behind this develop-
ment and whether or not progress is being made in the procedure?
For the basic procedure of the accreditation of the certifiers look at flowchart 1. What is
evident from this is, that a fishery suitable for certification is able to choose the Inde-
pendent Certifier them self.
The Chain of Custody
The Chain of Custody Standard is the MSC’s traceability measure. The guiding principle
in the development of this Certification Methodology has been the need to specify a sys-
tem that ensures the MSC logo on fish or fish products is a credible assurance that the
fish is derived from a well managed and sustainable fishery, as defined by the MSC fish-
eries certification Standard and ultimately, the MSC claim. Thereby, minimising the risk
of public confusion between those fish and fish products that have been certified and
those that have not.
The purposes of this document are:
1. To establish a consistent certification methodology for Chain of Custody certifi-
cation to enable all MSC certification bodies to operate in a consistent and con-
trolled manner.
2. To provide the transparency that is required of an international accreditation body
for it to have credibility with potential stakeholders, including governments, in-
ternational governmental bodies (e.g. EU, fishery managers, certification bodies,
suppliers of fish and fish products, non-governmental organisations and consum-
ers).
3. To provide documentation designed to assure long-term continuity and consis-
tency of the delivery of chain of custody certification.
4. To serve as a training document for certification bodies (MSC 2002).
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For a basic picture as to what steps a fishery can fully go through in order to gain
certification see flowchart 3. Following a favourable certification, the fishery earns
the claim of being a well-managed and sustainable fishery.
Flowchart 3: Main steps in fishery assessment process (Source MSC homepage)
Client contacts the MSC for
information about the
certification scheme
Client evaluates details of
the certification scheme
Client chooses an accredited
certification body from the list
available on the MSC
Client
decides to
proceed with
assessment
of fishery
The Determination is
posted on the MSC website
for 21 days & is subject to the
MSC Objections Procedure
 Determination
of the certification
body is final
Yes
Certification body visits
fishery and prepares a
confidential pre-assessment
report for the client
Assessment team
undertakes full assessment
of the fishery against the
MSC Standard
Client
reviews
pre-assessment report
and decides to proceed
to a full
assessment
Yes
No further
actionNo
Stakeholders
comment on
draft report
Peer review
of draft
report Certification
body reviews assess-
ment results, peer review and
public comment and makes
a determination on
the fishery
The certification body hears
the objection. If the objector
is not satisfied, the objection
may be heard by the MSC
Objections Panel
No objections
Objection
Fees are negotiated
between certification body
and client for pre-
assessment and budget for
full assessment
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4.1.4 What is the MSC doing?
“The aim of the MSC, when fully operational, is to provide a governance
scheme in which private certification agencies are empowered to certify
local fleets as following a sustainable fisheries code of conduct. Processors
and distributors who pledge to buy fish only from certified fleets will be
allowed to place the MSC logo on their products, and retailers and individ-
ual consumers will be urged to disassociate themselves from fish products
that lack the MSC logo. The MSC as an institution facilitates the process
by developing the code of conduct and by certifying the monitoring firms
who certify local fleets; that is, the MSC sets” (Steinberg 2000, 2).
When the WWF and Unilever launched the MSC in 1997 both parties decided not to in-
clude other stakeholders in the negotiations of standards and principles. To say they were
completely excluded would be false for the MSC Principles and Criteria were agreed
after extensive engagement with fisheries experts, scientists, environmental organisations
and those with a strong interest in preserving fish stocks for the future. These Principles
and Criteria are based on the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisations Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, however they were added upon after its founders
began to debate the exact content of its ‘Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing’.
The burning question was whether ‘sustainability’ should solely refer to the sustainability
of ecological communities or to the sustainability of economic and social communities as
well, in which case the MSC would take on the burden of attempting to minimise social
disruption along with minimising environmental degradation (MSC 1997) For a discus-
sion of the MSC’s Principles and Criteria and how they relate to the FAO’s Code go to
section 5.1.
Summary: How it basically all works?
One of the main aims of the MSC is to promote equal access to its certification pro-
gramme and thus the size, scale, type of location or intensity of the fishery has no rele-
vance. As will be shown in the following chapter the fisheries so far certified are very
different from each other in accordance with these aims. Furthermore, in accordance with
the third principle of the MSC, recognition for the need to observe and respect the inter-
ests of those people dependent on fishing for food and livelihood is stated. Under its vol-
untary scheme, fisheries around the world can apply to be independently assessed against
the MSC standard. They are independently assessed for the process is not carried out by
THE MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF A
PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
71
the MSC, but by Independent Certification Bodies who have been approved or accredited
by the MSC. It is their task to rigorously assess a fishery that wishes to achieve certifica-
tion to the MSC standard. If a fishery meets the standard it is then certified. Once certi-
fied, companies wishing to use the MSC products undergo a Chain of Custody certifica-
tion that guarantees traceability of MSC-labelled seafood. This is to ensure that it has
been separated from non-certified products at every stage of the production. Processors
and distributors who pledge to buy fish only from certified fleets will be allowed to place
the MSC logo on their products.
The MSC certification process is based on a ‘continuous improvement’ model allowing
for knowledge, scientific analysis and changing circumstances to influence the proce-
dures. This is achieved through involving as many stakeholders in such a way that cre-
ates openness for all whilst working towards the same goal. The next section underlines
the fisheries that have been certified and what has been happening within them. At the
same time the section highlights the learning curve that the MSC has experienced.
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4.2 The certified fisheries
The four criteria that are regarded as being decisive for the governance potential of the
MSC are at the bottom of the following investigation. Seven fisheries are discussed in
chronological order of their certification. In the end game of our project the independent
certification bodies recently awarded certification to three more fisheries that could,
much to our regret, not be accounted for analysis any more.25
4.2.1 Thames Blackwater Herring Driftnet Fishery
The fishery in context: The Thames Blackwater Herring (Clupea harengus) is a small-
scale driftnet (a small floating gill net) fishery located in the
Greater Thames Estuary within the six-mile limit in the
United Kingdom. The Thames Blackwater herring itself is a
unique stock, which is separate from the North Sea herring.
Both drift nets and mid-water trawls fish the stock, however,
trawl fishing is prohibited from a designated area within
which only gill netting for herring is allowed. The former UK
Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Food26 established this
‘Drift-net Regulatory Area’ after it investigated the negative effects of trawling on the
herring spawning grounds.
While the fishery has been going on since the forties, it was the decline of the main North
Sea herring stock that resulted in an increased fishing effort being expended on the
Thames Blackwater herring with catches peaking in 1972/73 a record 606 t. As a result
of this increasing pressure, a Herring Management Committee was established in 1976
primary to ensure the long-term conservation of the stock. The committee was supposed
to enable local involvement in management through providing a forum for stakeholders
                                                
25 The South Georgian Patagonian Toothfish Longline Fishery was awarded certification in March 2004,
the certification procedure ended successfully for the South African Hake Trawl Fishery in April 2004 and
the Mexican Baja California Red Rock Lobster becoming with its certification in April 2004 the first com-
munity-based, developing world fishery to be certified under the international programme.
26 The functions of the ministry have been taken over by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (DEFRA) in June 2001.
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and also as a means for implementing a voluntary quota at a time when fish stocks were
obviously under pressure. However, the Thames Blackwater driftnet fishery had to be
closed in 1976 due to a substantial decline in spawning stock biomass and the committee
stopped meeting due to lack of support three years later.
After an apparent rapid recovery, the fishery was re-opened in 1981. It has since been
maintained through a strict management system of quotas, which are set annually and
monitored by the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). The
Total Allowable Catch (TAC)27 for the fishery is determined on the basis of a stock as-
sessment that is carried out twice a year through a contracted governmental research
agency. The access to the Thames Blackwater herring fishery is managed through a li-
cense-system which is issued under the Sea Fish Act of 1967. Any applicant owning a
registered vessel under 17 meters length overall can obtain a license from DEFRA and
enter the fishery. The fishery is therefore highly accessible. However, less than ten ves-
sels are usually active in the fishery although the total number of licenses issued each
year is around 50. These boats are generally less than ten meters length overall. This
situation reflects the low herring price and the small demand for herring of the size
landed (Miller 1999). Furthermore, a local management body, the Kent and Essex Sea
Fisheries Committee, has legal management responsibilities within the six-mile inshore
zone and is charged with formulating and enforcing by-laws. Issues covered by the by-
laws include the net size, minimum allowable landing sizes, dates when fishing is per-
mitted etc.
To put the Thames Blackwater fishery in perspective, DEFRA set its Total Allowable
Catch at 121 t in the year 2000. The fishery does not reach that quota and produces only
an average of approximately 40 to 70 t per year. In comparison, the TAC for the North
Sea stock was 270,000 t in 1999.28 As Ronan Roche from the Essex Estuaries Initiative
explains: “It is very hard for the fishermen to catch enough Herring now and the reason
for that is the intense fishing pressure that was put on the stock in the past” (Roche
                                                
27 Definition
28 The North Sea Herring is going through an independent certifier’s assessment at the moment.
THE MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF A
PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
74
2004)29. The independent certifiers surveillance report number 5 from January 2004,
however, states, “these low catch rates are thought to be due to location and density of
shoals, rather than low biomass. There are currently only two boats operating in the drift
net fishery, so although each vessel is setting more nets than usual, there is overall less
sampling meaning that they may find it more difficult to find concentrations of fish”
(Hilbrands 2004). It is expected that catch rates in the drift net fishery will increase as
spawning takes place.
Observable behavioural changes:
“Overall, the changes that the Marine Stewardship Council has brought
about have been quite small because the Blackwater Herring was funda-
mentally a sustainable fishery before its certification and it was felt that it
would quite easily get the MSC certification. In fact, it was sort of a test
case for the MSC because it was the first fishery in the world, neck in neck
with the Australian Rock Lobster, to be certified” (Roche 2004).
Overall, the fisheries officer Ronan Roche’s impression might be right and the MSC did
not cause any major changes. The assessment process began in March 1999 and certifi-
cation was awarded twelve months later. Studying the certifier’s public summary report
from 2000, however, highlights that some minor corrective action requests to the Thames
Blackwater fishery were raised such as that the fishery should develop a management
plan or adequate management framework and provide a recording of discard and by-
catch. Behavioural change occurred in so far as that the fishermen started to report where
they fish, how much they take and the amount of discard and by-catch. Furthermore, a
management plan was put down on paper. “This is something that would not have been
required except for the fact that it is required for the MSC. But there is not really a by-
catch anyway. It has brought about changes in the fishery but these are more details
rather than fundamental ways of fishing. The way the fish is caught has not changed”
(Roche 2004). Backing up this statement, the independent certifier comes to the conclu-
sion that “the fishing method seems highly selective in this area. The small by-catch and
smaller discards makes management of this fishery relatively straightforward” (Miller
                                                
29 For the analysis of the Thames Blackwater Herring Fishery we spoke with Ronan Roche and will refer to
this interview as Roche 2004. Contact: Essex Estuaries Initiative, Colchester Borough Council, PO Box
885, Colchester, Essex, CO1 1ZE, +44 1206 282480. Telephone-Interview conducted and recorded on
April 19 2004.
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1999, 17). Furthermore, the Herring Management Committee that collapsed in 1979 has
been resurrected by the stakeholders mainly due to their desire to achieve MSC certifica-
tion.
Market impacts of certification: Initially, the Thames Blackwater Herring Fishery con-
tacted the MSC to achieve certification in order to gain a competitive advantage against
the North Sea Herring. Consequently, it was for economical reasons that the fishery ap-
plied for certification. “The idea was that it would increase the market price of the her-
ring. A big problem now is that it has not necessarily done that” (Roche 2004). For vari-
ous reasons, in the case of the Blackwater Herring, the market did not respond to the
MSC certification yet. Thames Herring is sold locally and also goes through the major
supermarkets in England. Although herring fish might be an essential part of the food
culture in other European countries it is not a particularly attractive fish in England.
“Having the MSC certification is not going to make people eat herring who do not fun-
damentally like the fish, and in England that is the majority of the people” (Roche 2004).
Furthermore, the Blackwater Herring Fishery consists only of a few boats and the amount
of fish that is caught is very low, hence, the supply is inconsistent. From a market point
of view and from the point of view of larger retailers, one of the key criteria for intro-
ducing and contracting new products is consistency of supply. Therefore, the fishery has
not got the possibility to sell herring for any further processing that could make it be-
come more attractive to the consumers in England and improve its marked price. Since
the Thames Blackwater fishery is economically not successful and so small that the fish-
ery itself is not able to afford MSC certification it gives rise to concern about the MSC’s
future prospects in this case.
“Here, everything has to be done through grants from British governmental
organisations. The fishery is always going to be dependent on getting grant
money from somewhere and the benefit to the fishery, to the fishermen, in
terms of an increased price, has not been realised. It is a lot of work for a
relatively small return. It may be that the returns are just going to be a long
time in coming, it may be that we just need to be more patient” (Roche
2004).
Although Thames Blackwater intends to keep the certification, it might be that it has to
withdraw from the programme, depending on its success in raising funds. It is for that
reason that Roche points out his opinion that the MSC certification only works for large
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profitable fisheries. However, the fisheries that are large and profitable also tend to be the
ones that are quite unsustainable.
Summary: The Thames Blackwater Herring Driftnet fishery is with its 40-70 t per year a
very small fishery and one should not forget its scale when analysing the potential of a
global governance mechanism. This fishery with only two boats operating at the moment
is certainly not causing an overexploitation of the stock. It is not a promising example of
a certified fishery, especially since the market does not seem to respond to the MSC la-
bel.  In terms of counterfactual reasoning on the effects of the MSC on this fishery it is to
say that the stakeholders would not exactly, but to a very large extent, behave in the same
way without the influence of the MSC rules. To put the effects of the MSC on the
Thames Blackwater Fishery in a nutshell it is to say that “the way it fishes has not
changed. What the MSC has improved is that people involved are now better keeping
records of herring and people pay quite a lot of attention on this fishery, it is getting quite
a lot of publicity through the MSC” (Roche 2004).
4.2.2 Western Australian Rock Lobster
The Fishery in Context: The Western Australia
Rock Lobster (WARL) fishery is regarded as one
of the first managed fisheries in Western Austra-
lia. In an effort to maintain the fisheries future,
commercial fishers, processors and government
joined forces in 1963 and began carrying out re-
sponsible management. This involved the introduction of minimum size requirements,
seasonal fishing and a ban on catching breeding females. They also started to collect data
regarding the fishery at this time, which allows for the catches to be predicted accurately
by fisheries scientists therefore enabling managers to implement the correct controls in
order to maintain sustainable levels and a consistent catch size (Department of Fisheries
2000). The catch is usually between 10,000-12,000 tonnes as the fishery is managed pri-
marily through licensing under the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (SCS 2000).
Techniques used to manage the fishery include:
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- Annual research to monitor settling juveniles to predict population size in later years
- Fishing season is limited from November to June each year
- Minimum size requirement for collected lobster
- Protection for the breeding females
- Fishing licences are limited to 640 commercial operators
- Each license is limited to a maximum number of pots
- A ban on the use of pointed implements for taking lobster (either recreational or
commercially)
- Bag limits for recreational fishers
In March 2000, the Marine Stewardship Council certified the West Coast Rock Lobster
Fishery. It was the rock lobster industry that initiated interest in the MSC certification,
however, the Western Australian Fishing Industry Council (WAFIC), the Western Rock
Lobster Development Association and the Department of Fisheries gave their support
(DOF 2003). In fact, “the government of Western Australia and the rock lobster industry
shared the cost of certification for the Western Australia rock lobster” (Wessells 2000).
The evaluations conducted for this fishery occurred primarily between July 1999 and
October 1999. Due to the management nature of the fishery and its creditability the
WARL was perfectly placed to be the guinea pig fishery for the MSC certification proc-
ess. The evaluation of the fishery was preceded by a preliminary analysis (pre-
assessment) that took place over several weeks in 1997 (SCS 2000).
Observable behavioural changes: The decision of the evaluation team to certify the fish-
ery as well managed was based on requirements for continued improvement for future
certification. The evaluation team did find some deficiencies in the fishery complying
with Principle 2. Therefore, the fishery has to set in place the requirements put forth by
the evaluation team in order avoid having the certificate repealed:
- To carryout a comprehensive ecological risk assessment; 14 months were designated
for this to be carried out in order to show the risks of the fishery and fishing opera-
tions to the ecosystem. Once completed a list of prioritised tasks is set out together
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with strategies to address the risks (SCS 2000). The risk assessment is reviewed by
independent and external expert reviewers, as well as it being available for the public
to comment on. This shows a willingness to be transparent and open within the whole
certification process and not just at the initial stages.
What actually occurred was that an extension was given to the fishery in order to
fully carryout this requirement. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, a parallel
process was occurring at the time for a risk assessment to meet the Australian na-
tional requirements the fishery. These two processes needed to be harmonised as they
depend on the same sets of information and analyses. Secondly, the workshop par-
ticipants and conveners agreed that additional information and analyses were needed
to provide detailed justification for some of the risk rankings. (Chaffee 2001) This
was something that was overseen, for the development of this information required
more time than originally anticipated by department staff.
Furthermore, a reason cited by some stakeholders for this lack of detail within the
Ecological Risk Assessment was that there was inadequate ecological expertise at the
workshop. Attendees appeared not to be selected based on their technical or scientific
expertise in fisheries or ecology but on organisational affiliations (Chaffee 2001).
This could be seen as a failure on the part of the certifiers and MSC to adequately
represent the various stakeholders and therefore be criticised for not being legitimate
and transparent enough. Moreover, the criticisms were taken on board and integrated
for better involvement next time on.
- To prepare an environmental management plan within 24 months and have it opera-
tional within 36 months (allowing for 12 months for public comment and input); This
will address impacts of the fishery on the environment, include proposed objectives,
strategies, indicators and performance measures (SCS 2000).
- To increase transparency of decision making, specifically increasing the participa-
tion of the environmental community and their representatives; “Within 24 months of
certification there will be increased participation of the environmental community or
their representatives in the decision-making processes in the fishery. This will include
consultation on impending decisions, and involvement (full participation) in decision-
making committees at a range of levels in the fishery” (Chaffee 2001).
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This is one behavioural change that was successful in a relatively short matter of
time. The Conservation Council of Western Australia, an NGO, was offered member-
ship on the Research Subcommittee of the statutory Rock Lobster Industry Advisory
Committee (RLIAC). They rejected the offer, but accepted a later offer of observer
status. This means they are present at the meetings and may participate but only at the
discretion of the chair. The Conservation Council has been allocated funds for the
appointment and maintenance of a sustainable fisheries officer, to facilitate more ef-
fective communications between the fishing community and the NGOs and fisheries
management in Western Australia (Chaffee 2001).
- To gather data on the by-catch of ICON species especially mammals, seabirds, dol-
phins and whales (MSC 2000). This is another successful factor that has met the re-
quirement for the continuation of certification, showing that the MSC’s standards did
have an effect on the fisheries behaviour. It is based on three initiatives that were car-
ried out: (a) voluntary questionnaire survey of the fisher's recent experience with in-
teractions/catch with icon species; (b) additional columns in the fishers voluntary
logbooks to record interactions/catch of icon species; (c) designed monitoring pro-
gram conducted by research staff of Fisheries Western Australia to record all interac-
tion/catch during the Catch Monitoring Program conducted on fishing vessels for 8
months each year (Chaffee 2001). Moreover, the questionnaires that were sent out
were starting to be returned by the fisherman. This highlights a significant change in
the attitude of the fishermen brought about by the MSC process.
These have been the main influences of the MSC code of conduct, although it must be
noted that as this was one of the first two fisheries to go through the process there was
some confusion concerning what was to be expected in order to meet the requirements
(DOF 2003).
There have also been significant influences from other sources though. In 2002 the Fed-
eral Minister for the Environment and Heritage, Dr David Kemp, and Western Australian
Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Mr Kim Chance, announced that the
Western Rock Lobster Fishery had gained exemption from the export controls under the
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act). The
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Commonwealth Government developed a range of criteria to assess the ecological
sustainability of each fishery, which also made recommendations for the fishery to put in
place (DEH 2002).
Stakeholder involvement: At the beginning of the evaluation process stakeholders in the
fishery were identified and contacted in order to provide input wherever appropriate.
They were chosen from industry, government agencies, and the conservation community.
They were involved in the first process of identification of technical/scientific experts for
the evaluation team; a team that was based on the individuals scientific training and
reputation, ability to be objective, and knowledge of Australia’s fishery management
practices (with specific emphasis on the Western Australian Rock Lobster Fishery) (SCS
2000). Via this involvement the MSC is helping to legitimise its actions and provide
transparency throughout by involving lots of critical participants.
These stakeholders were also consulted about their views on the compliance of the fish-
ery with regards to the MSC Principles and Criteria. All stakeholders we met once, how-
ever, in the case of the environment community four separate meetings were held due to
them being the only stakeholder that expressed concerns about the management of the
fishery (SCS 2000). This provides evidence that, at least in the stakeholder involvement
process, the MSC is taking views seriously. Where stakeholders have issues with the
findings of the certifiers, these are brought up, representing transparency within the certi-
fication process.
Markets impacts of certification: MSC certification has definitely raised the profile of
WARL. Sales generate about AUS$ 300- 400 million annually in export to markets in-
cluding Japan, Hong Kong, China, USA and since certification they have opened up in
Europe. According to Cathy Roheim “there has been an increase of 20-25 new enquiries
to the Western Rock Lobster Development Association since the successful MSC certifi-
cation of the fishery was announced in March 2000. This represents a 15% increase on
the previous year” (Roheim 2002). Furthermore the label may have played a part in the
“European Union granting an autonomous tariff quota (ATQ) for 2003 enabling the im-
port of 1500 tonnes of frozen rock lobster for further processing at 6 per cent duty – well
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down on the usual 12.5 per cent tariff. In February 2004, the European Union agreed to
extend the ATQ until the end of 2006” (Dfat 2004).
The western rock lobster fishery is the most valuable single-species fishery in Australia
and usually represents about twenty per cent of the total value of Australia’s fisheries.
The MSC has helped to formulise arrangements within the fisheries management and has
implemented initiatives to address the need for additional monitoring of bycatch. Fur-
thermore it has helped to develop the lobster in Europe.
4.2.3 Alaska Salmon
Five salmon species have been certified:        
sockeye (Oncorhynchus nerka)
chum (Oncorhynchus. keta)
chinook (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha)
coho (Oncorhynchus kisutch)
pink (Oncorhynchus gorbuscha)
The fishery in context: Alaska's statewide commercial salmon fisheries’ program, the
world's largest, was certified as well-managed and sustainable in September 2000 and
was the third fishery to be awarded certification. According to one of its own press re-
leases “the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG) has been working on the MSC
certification since 1996” (ADFG 2000). "Alaska salmon managers have over 40 years of
experience in abundance-based, escapement-driven salmon management, where the fish
come first," adds Alaska Department of Fish and Game Commissioner Frank Rue. "The
department, the Board of Fisheries, fishermen, processors, and other stakeholder in the
industry have been co-operative stewards in the conservation and management of salmon
and all deserve to share in this recognition" (ADFG 2000).
The biological staff of the ADFG manages the Alaska Salmon fishery. Under the
Alaska state constitution it is required that the salmon habitat is conserved and protected.
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In 1959, statewide salmon harvests were about 25 million salmon a year. In 1999
Alaska's commercial salmon catch was 214 million fish, the second largest in the state's
history. The fishing season runs from May to September (MSC 2004). Catches in the past
decade have been generally above 190 million salmon with ex-vessel values exceeding
US$ 400 million annually. Numerically, pink salmon predominate, comprising more than
one-half of the statewide harvest. Roughly one-fourth of the harvest is sockeye salmon,
followed by chum, coho and chinook salmon. In product value, sockeye salmon have
always been the primary species. Outside of Alaska, however, many Pacific salmon
populations have been depleted, are listed as threatened or endangered, or have disap-
peared altogether - victims of dam construction, logging-related stream destruction, over-
fishing, pollution, and many other causes.
The elimination of high seas drift net fishing and the implementation of the Magnusen
Fisheries Management and Conservation Act in 1976 have been significant contributing
factors to the sustainability of Alaska salmon fisheries.  Equally important has been ef-
fective fisheries management on the part of ADFG. The state of Alaska continues to in-
vest in research and management programs designed to better assess and manage salmon
stocks.  Significant hatchery programs also began in 1974 (Chaffee 2000).
According to the MSC website, various management techniques are used and these in-
clude “establishing open and closed seasons; setting quotas, bag limits, harvest limits,
sex and size limitations; establishing the methods and means employed in the pursuit,
capture and transport of fish; watershed and habitat improvement, management, conser-
vation, protection, use, disposal, propagation and stocking of fish; regulating commercial
sport, guided sport, subsistence, and personal use fishing as needed for the conservation,
development, and utilisation of fisheries” (MSC 2004). Salmon are harvested by nets
(drift and set gillnets, purse seine) and by trawling. Other fisheries do work within the
Alaska Salmon Fishery area, which is expected due to the size of the fishery. In general,
non-salmon commercial fisheries do not overlap in time with the Alaska Salmon fishery.
Observable behavioural changes: The evaluation team found that the information they
were provided on the management of commercial Alaska salmon fisheries statewide pro-
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vided sufficient evidence to assert that the commercial salmon fisheries under the man-
agement of Alaska's Department of Fish and Game meet the MSC Principles and Crite-
ria. The evaluation team found that the two most significant areas for improvement were
in by-catch monitoring and in some aspects of the stock assessments and setting of es-
capement targets (Chaffee 2000). The escapement targets are of importance because of
the migration of these fish through US and Canadian areas. Transboundary stock man-
agement is needed in this case, which has caused disputes in the past and will continue to
throughout certification. The influence of the MSC to produce more knowledge within
this area with regards to actually monitoring the escapement targets may produce better
results of co-operation and communication. As Chaffee Points out in the initial report
concerning the situation in Alaska “authorities are overlapping and there may be contra-
dictory or confusing regulations for some fishery components…as yet there is little to
guide sharing of data and expertise, or in co-ordination of the two regulatory bodies”
(Chaffee 2000). This is again another area in which the MSC can help facilitate informa-
tion sharing, leading to better co-management.
Questions were raised about the fishery and the certification process from other quarters.
Trout Unlimited, an organisation also working for the sustainable interests of wild
salmon fisheries, has heavily criticised the certification of this fishery. In their opinion,
given the failed fishery management regimes throughout the Pacific Rim, coupled with
increasing knowledge about the factors that affect salmon productivity, it is no longer
sufficient to manage “just” the fishery; rather the salmon fisheries must be managed in
the context of preserving both salmon biodiversity and whole ecosystems (Trout Unlim-
ited 2002).
Stakeholder involvement: Due to the scope of all the Alaska Salmon Fisheries not all of
the stakeholders could be incorporated. In the Alaska Salmon Final Report (2000) it
states “ within the budget and scope of the project, it was impossible for the evaluation
team to contact and interview every single group individually. And no doubt, there will
be some individuals or groups that feel they did not have sufficient access to the evalua-
tion team or sufficient time in which to respond” (Chaffee 2000). This highlights one of
the problems that the MSC faces. There are different sized fisheries, and therefore the
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budget for each certification needs to be based in this context. From the material avail-
able it was unclear whether this is actually happening. If not, then it seriously jeopardises
the transparency issue of the MSC, although in this case a valid attempt was made to
include as many stakeholders as possible.
Market impacts of certification: What the MSC has done is to raise the profile of Alaskan
salmon and help increase its market share in other areas.  Cathy Roheim, a professor at
the University of Rhode Island and a member on the MSC Stakeholder Council, points
out that “it was 2002 before a significant number of companies were certified to sell
MSC-labelled products… at present, there are over 60 companies that have MSC chain-
of-custody certification, including the 5 largest producers: Trident Seafoods, Peter Pan,
Icicle Seafoods, Ocean Beauty Seafoods and Wards Cove Seafoods” (Roheim 2002).
Consequently, the potential market impacts of certification may: 1) create an increase in
prices; 2) reverse the decline in market share in markets domestic and overseas; and 3)
make in-roads into new markets. Taking each of these in turn, it can be shown that Alas-
kan salmon is in a market position in which the MSC label may well have a positive ef-
fect.
Alaskan salmon’s market share in key markets (domestic, Japan, Europe) has declined in
the last decade because of advertising and promotion of farmed salmon that has been
very effective, and has generated new markets for salmon in southern Europe. As the
presence of the MSC label and consumer education on sustainable fisheries increases the
Alaska Salmon currently remains in a good position within the market to increase its
market potential. Other Salmon fisheries are in the process of going through the MSC
certification process, which might lessen the effect of the Alaska Salmon.
Summary: Despite the formalisation of a management structure the MSC has triggered
very few changes. Having said that, there is a strong case that in formulising the man-
agement structure and continuing with regular visits and assessments, the MSC may fa-
cilitate the sharing of knowledge within the Alaskan State.
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4.2.4 New Zealand Hoki
The fishery in context: The New Zealand Hoki Fish-
ery was awarded certification in March 2001 by
Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS), with the
pre-assessment stage beginning in early 2000. The
Hoki fishery is the largest in New Zealand and one
of its most valuable. Foreign fishing fleets, primar-
ily from Russia and Japan, developed the Hoki fish-
ery in the 1970’s and by 1977 the catches were re-
ported to have increased to almost 100,000 tonnes. This figure dropped substantially in
1978 as New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone was established. The number of li-
censes granted to foreign fleets decreased and catch limits were enforced. By the late
1980’s licenses were no longer granted to foreign fleets within the EEZ. Before 1986/87
annual catches remained below 50,000 tonnes, however, during 1986/87 the TACC (To-
tal Allowable Commercial Catch) was increased to 250,000 and catches increased to
216,000 by 1987/88 (SGS 2000). For the MSC this is a substantial fishery as in 2001 the
TAC was set at 200,000 tonnes. The majority is exported to valuable markets in the US,
EU, Japan and Australia and of the $ 294 million Hoki earned in 1998, $ 88 million was
from exports to European markets.
A variety of data are collected in order to assess the stock. These range from fishery
catch and effort data, information on hydrostatic and bottom trawl surveys, age and
length composition, maturity information, and information from studies about stock
structure. The fisheries act of 1996 provides for maximum sustainable yield (MSY) as
the management target for the sustainable management of fisheries. The fishery in ques-
tion is said to have two stocks – an Eastern and Western. The eastern stock is about one
third of the size of the western but accounts for 40 percent of the current Hoki catch.
Fishing takes place all year round in depths of 400-800m, although the main fishing takes
place from mid-July to late August.
The Quota Management System was introduced in 1986 to manage and conserve New
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Zealand’s major commercial fisheries. It is based on an output management regime
(commonly known as a quota). The approach used is to directly limit the total quantity
taken by the commercial uses and for the conservation of the resource. New Zealand was
the first to use quotas on a broad scale in a multi- species fishery. It has been considered
by the certifier SGS that during the past fifteen years, the Hoki fishery, managed under
QMS has provided an effective mechanism for safeguarding the Hoki stock, increased
economic efficiencies in the fishery and improved incentives for fishing participants to
utilise the fishery in a sustainable manner.
In 1997 the Hoki Fishery Management Company was established in order to improve the
management and economics of the Hoki fishery through better collaboration amongst the
shareholders in research, management, organisation, and advocacy. They saw the MSC
certification procedure as one way in which to help achieve these goals.
Observable behavioural changes: As previously stated, certification was awarded in
March 2001. This was, however, based on the management company carrying out several
minor Corrective Action Plans. On the 25th April 2001 the Royal Forest and Bird Protec-
tion Society of New Zealand (RFBPS) complained to the MSC against this Certification
on the grounds that the SGS report leading to the certificate, failed adequately to interpret
and to comply with the MSC Principles and Criteria and the requirements of Certifica-
tion. Based on these grounds they asked that the Certificate be withdrawn.
Consequently, this complaint was referred to the Board of Trustees of the MSC who sub-
sequently convened a panel to conduct an appeal process. The appeal panel concluded
that the Hoki Fishery in its present state is suitable for certification. Accordingly, the
panel confirmed the MSC certificate, however, confirmation was conditional upon the
structured implementation of the Corrective Action Plan and compliance with a number
of recommendations:
1. Ensure that the research programme being pursued by the HFMC includes a ge-
netic component.
2. Seal excluding devices be tested in New Zealand waters as a complement to the
trials off Western Tasmania in order to avoid bigger amounts of by-catch.
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3. The trawl grounds should be mapped, especially those areas where trawls impact
the seabed
4. Using the information from (3), a preliminary risk assessment of the impacts of
the fishery on benthic habitats should be undertaken as a priority, even if the full
ecological risk assessment proposed in the CAP requires several years to com-
plete.
5. Interim but measurable objectives for key ecosystem components should be set
using existing knowledge, consistent with the principles of the Precautionary Ap-
proach, and with the full understanding that these objectives would be revised as
the Ecological Risk Assessment is completed.
6. The fishery observer programme, and the procedures manual, is to be reviewed
for effectiveness and efficiency (SGS 2003).
As part of on going assessment for the continuation of certification some headway has
been made with regards to the points just mentioned. The Corrective Action Plan high-
lights that behavioural changes of the fishermen are required. For example in relation to
by-catch of seals, the use of seal excluding devices can be seen as an effect on the fish-
ermen triggered by MSC rules. In other areas, however, behavioural changes will take a
considerable amount of time due to the lengthy processes of ecological risk assessment.
Gerry Leape, head of marine conservation at the US-based National Environmental
Trust, told a meeting in London back in May 2003 that trawling for hoki kills an esti-
mated 1000 fur seals and 600 endangered albatrosses a year (New Scientist 2003). Based
on this and other revelations the article claimed that unless the Marine Stewardship
Council cleans up its act, green groups from Greenpeace to the Sierra Club might with-
draw their support for the label. Brendan May, the MSC's chief executive said in defence
that the green groups' desire for a perfect system was undermining pragmatic efforts to
improve fishing practices. May also added that a timetable has been agreed with the
fishing companies to improve things in the case of the New Zealand Hoki (New Scientist
2003). Nonetheless, another scathing article was recently published by Paul Brown in the
Guardian Newspaper, in which he stated the Hoki fishery had failed to comply with the
New Zealand fisheries act that requires action be taken to avoid adverse effects on the
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aquatic environment (Brown 2004). The case of this fishery shows the difficulties that
the MSC has to deal with in operating a certification system acceptable to industry, gov-
ernments and the environmental movement.
Stakeholder Involvement: As in the previous case of the Alaska Salmon, due to the size
of the fishery not all of the stakeholders were contacted due to the budget and scope of
the project. For comments relating to what this entails for the MSC process please refer
back to stakeholder involvement in Alaska Salmon.
Market Impacts: Marketwise the MSC has had effects upon this fishery. According to
Roheim
“soon after certification of the New Zealand Hoki fishery, Unilever began
to purchase NZ Hoki for the first time, the value of which was thought to
be in excess of US$ 3 million. Unilever has indicated that it would take at
least 4,000 tonnes a year from local Hoki stocks which will mean the in-
dustry benefits by as much as US$ 10 million” (Roheim 2002).
Furthermore the price of Hoki blocks rose by around 10% in 2002 and the volatility
within the price has decreased.
“This is particularly true for whitefish, such as Hoki. Companies such as
Unilever usually switch between whitefish categories (haddock, cod, pol-
lock) to use in fish sticks with 10% changes in price. Now they are com-
mitted to whitefish from sustainable sources, and as a result are not as eas-
ily able to switch between whitefish products. This results in lower price
volatility. However, we should keep in mind that as more whitefish prod-
ucts become certified (e.g. Alaska pollock) this reduction in price volatility
will likely decrease” (Roheim 2002).
Summary: Although a fairly robust management system was already in place, the MSC
has had effects upon this fishery, especially regarding principle 2 of the MSC Principles
and Criteria. Stakeholder involvement was once again not fully realised due to the size of
the project. But stakeholders have had impacts, which is evident by considering the com-
plaint made from the NGO perspective.
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4.2.5 Burry Inlet Cockles
The fishery in context: The Burry Inlet Cockle
Fishery is based on hand ranking and sieving of
cockles and has largely existed in the same way
since the 1800s. The Burry Inlet is located be-
tween the towns of Llanelli and Burry Port in the
north, and the village of Penclawdd in Gower in
the south, South Wales, UK, and the fishery is
limited to the inter-tidal zone in British Territo-
rial Waters. The pre-assessment began in March
2000 and the MSC certification was awarded in
April 2001.
Compared to the TAC of other certified fisheries such as the New Zealand Hoki with its
200,000 tonnes per annum, the Burry Inlet Cockle is a rather small fishery with a catch of
7135 t of cockles in the year 2000. It is a traditional source of food and employment for
the local area, dating back to Roman and Mediaeval times. Women usually fished the
cockles but with the decline of heavy industry in this area they were displaced by unem-
ployed men in the sixties. In 1921 a minimum landing size was introduced by the South
Wales Sea Fisheries Committee (SWSFC) to protect the breeding stock. The committee
contains, among others, representatives from local councils, and reports to the Welsh
assembly. Already in 1965, the increasing excessive fishing effort led to a tightly con-
trolled management scheme. The Burry Inlet Cockle Order was established to license the
fishery and so control the quantity of cockles taken. Since then the number of licenses
has varied between 43 and 67. The South Wales Sea Fisheries Committee is the body
responsible for managing this order and it sets individual daily quotas of 0.3-0.6 tonnes
per person per day depending on an annual scientific assessment of the cockle biomass.
Furthermore, it is issuing a number of by-laws, concerning mesh-size, the method of
collection and gathering times. The Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture
Science, Lowestoft, is carrying out cockle stock surveys. From these surveys a level of
fishable stock is set and the number of cockle licences and daily cockle quota is then
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broadly set to give rise to the desired fishing effort. The minimum cockle sizes are set via
a riddle size (a hand held measurement device) to allow the survival of sufficient
spawning stock. The stock is said to be very consistent between the years and it seems to
be in an excellent condition. The certification report for the fishery sums up that “regula-
tion, combined with regular and effective inspections, has led to a management system,
with operational criteria, that require exploitation of the cockle stock to be responsible
and sustainable” (Hough and Holt 2000).
Observable behavioural changes:
“The MSC did not really cause any changes in the fishery’s behaviour. We
felt that we had a scheme that met the MSC criteria so why not advertise
it? No changes in management practice have been required. However, the
independent certifiers have requested some corrective actions such as de-
scribing and confirming how we go about things” (Coats 2004)30.
The fishery consistently met the requirements of the MSC Principles and Criteria for
Sustainable Fisheries without any major changes. The minor corrective actions that the
certifier required concerned the clear statement of its existing objectives. These long and
short-term objectives for the management of the fishery have only been implicit in the
regulating order and byelaws governing the fishery (Hough and Holt 2000).
Market impacts of certification: Initially, the SWSFC contacted the Marine Stewardship
Council after they became aware of it through press information. From the South Wales
Sea Fisheries Committee’s point of view the motivation for certification has been recog-
nition of their good practice, which has been realised to a large extent (Coates 2004). The
cockle industry however hoped for larger markets for their product. Coates sums up the
market impact of the MSC certificate as follows:
“No change for most. Cockles are sought after, so I do not think it has
given competitive advantage. In time, only certified sources could be used,
but markets are not yet discerning. Dutch operators seem keen that their
                                                
30 For the analysis of the Burry Inlet Cockle Fishery we send a questionnaire to Phil Coates and will refer
to this interview as Coates 2004. Contact: South Wales Sea Fisheries Committee, Queen’s Buildings,
Cambrian Place, Swansea SA1 1TW, +44 1792 654 466. Answered questionnaire received via email on
April 21.
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UK subsidiaries gain certification. It may well be that their markets have
required this” (Coates 2004).
Similarly to the Thames Blackwater Herring, the Burry Inlet Cockle Fishery is depending
on grants for the certification since the costs are not met by monetary benefits. The costs
were grant aided for the first three years and unless the SWSFC is not successful in fund-
raising, the required upcoming re-classification of the fishery as sustainable may mean
that it will not be able continue and withdraw from the MSC programme.
Asking Coats for his opinion on the future market potential of the MSC eco-label for the
fishing industry, he sees the Burry Inlet Cockle Fishery as an ideal early project to give
the MSC initiative credibility, momentum, and publicity. He believes that once the
scheme would get widespread adoption, no market supplier could afford to remain un-
certified, but there would be a long way to go.
Summary: With regard to the question of whether the MSC had behavioural impacts it
can be summarised that, “the fishery would not differ in any way without the MSC certi-
fication. It already aspired and met the principles” (Coats 2004).
4.2.6 South West Mackerel Handline Fishery
The fishery in context: The South West Mack-
erel Handline Fishery is located at the South
West Coast of England and most of the fish-
ing occurs within eight nautical miles off
shore. Its targeted mackerel stock is, in line
with the International Council for the Explo-
ration of the Sea (ICES) definition, considered to be part of the Western Stock Compo-
nent of the North East Atlantic Mackerel Stock. The handline fishery is therefore seen as
an integral, albeit minor, part of the overall fishery pressure on the stock.
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The growth of the fishing industry in the South West of England dates back to the 14th
Century. With larger catches on bigger boats, landing data of mackerel catches show a
significant decrease in the 20th Century from 5000 t in 1926 landed in Newlyn, to 1000 t
in 1950 and only 20 t in the mid sixties. As a result of this decline, restrictions on mack-
erel fishing in the South West were first put into force in 1977. Allocations of quota for
the South West Mackerel Handline Fishery were calculated based solely on track record,
i.e. landings during a rolling reference period. Since 1998 the fishery has received an
annual allocation of 0.83 % of the UK quota or 1750 t (whichever is the greater). Prior to
that, in 1981, the South West Mackerel Box, a special area in which only handliners are
permitted to target mackerel, was introduced to protect juvenile mackerel (present in the
area in high numbers) from trawling (EU Council Regulation No. 894/97 Article 9). The
area of the box was expanded to its present position in 1989. Specific targeting of mack-
erel within the box is only permitted by handlining, but a derogation of 15% by-catch of
mackerel is permitted for vessels fishing for other species. Fisheries management is di-
rected ultimately by the EU under the Common Fisheries Policy. The Council of Minis-
ters determine Total Allowable Catches (TACs) based on the scientific advice they re-
ceive from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea Advisory Committee
on Fisheries Management. TACs were apportioned between the EU member states on the
basis of historic fishing rights in 1983 and are maintained by the policy of ‘relative sta-
bility’. The UK quota is then allocated by the UK Department for Environment, Fisheries
and Rural Affairs and managed locally, largely by Producer Organisations. The Producer
Organisations responsible for the South West Mackerel Handline Fishery are the South
Western Fish Producers Organisation and the Cornish Fish Producers Organisation. Fish-
ermen are not permitted to catch fish below a minimum landing size of 20 cm. Landings
from the handline fishery are recorded in each port at auction by DEFRA fishery officers
which allows the fishery to be closed when the quota has been reached.
The handline method simply uses lines to which 25-30 hooks are attached. As the secre-
tary of the South West Handline Fishermen’s Association states, “it is the same method
that we have been using for 30 years and there is just no way that we could ever have any
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impact on the stock at all. Our quota is less than one per cent of the total UK quota.”
(Muirhead 2004)31. The MSC certification was awarded in July 2001.
Observable behavioural impacts: Muirhead is convinced that the fishery would have
gone on the same way regardless of the MSC certification since the actual fishing method
is such a simple one that it cannot be altered and DEFRA’s quota system is already es-
tablished and formalised for a long time. Therefore, he cannot identify any behavioural
changes in the case of this fishery. “The MSC had an impact in the way that people are
looking better after the fish now. The Marine Stewardship Council was very helpful and
encouraged the fishery through good marketing and promotion of its products” (Muir-
head 2004).
The certifier’s report, however, request minor corrective actions that have been carried
out by the fishery: The use of logbooks by handline fishers, whether operating vessels of
under or over 10m, and recording of landings and by-catch is recommended. Further-
more,clearer information is now provided to fishers on regulations applicable to the han-
dline fishery. The need for such information has been particularly apparent given the lack
of knowledge on the minimum landing size.
Market impacts of certification: In the case of this fishery the market seems to respond to
the eco-label and reward the classification as sustainable and well managed with a higher
value of the product.
“The main reason for the fishery’s involvement with the MSC was to get a
better price for the fish to be quite blunt, which certainly appears to be
happening. I think consumers are becoming much more conscious about
how their fish is caught and if it is caught in a sustainable way they are
more likely to buy it” (Muirhead 2004).
                                                
31 For the analysis of the South West Mackerel Handline Fishery we got in contact with David Muirhead
and refer to this source as Muirhead 2004. Contact: South West Handline Fishermen’s Association, Triss
Rose Cottage, Hekston, Cornwall, +44 1326 555813. The telephone interview was conducted and recorded
on April 19 2004.
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4.2.7 Loch Torridon Nephrops Creel Fishery
The fishery in context: The Loch Torri-
don Nephrops Creel Fishery (LTNCF)
at the North West Coast of Scotland
passed the MSC standard for well-
managed and sustainable fisheries in
January 2003. In supporting around a
dozen boats and with a Total Allow-
able Catch of 100 to 150 tonnes per
year it is a fairly small fishery.
The method of capture is baited creels/pots deployed on lines. “This fishery has been
going on at the west coast of Scotland for the last 30, 40, 50 years even and we know that
the overall captures have been pretty good and regular for a long time” (Starr 2004)32.
Most of the catch is exported weekly to Spain.
In 1984, a three-mile limit that banned the use of mobile fishing gear was repealed
through the Scottish Inshore Fishing Act. As a consequence, trawlers started to fish in the
same inshore area for nephrops as the creel boats, which caused conflicts between them.
Since these trawlers damaged the eco-system, endangered the jobs of local fishermen and
caused damage of creel boat fishing gear, they were seen as unsustainable and the local
fishermen started to complain about this situation. The Loch Torridon Creel Fishery ac-
tively sought to have an area closed to the mobile fishing gear, which finally was estab-
lished on November 1st 2000. An experimental three-zone system was created, consisting
out of (a) a creel-only, (b) a trawling, and (c) a mixed zone. These areas were defined for
an initial period of five years after which they are supposed to be assessed. The assess-
ment is ongoing and it will decide whether the three-zone system is going to be contin-
ued in the future.
                                                
32 For the analysis of the Loch Torridon Nephrops Creel Fishery we got in contact with Karen Starr via a
questionnaire and a telephone interview and refer to this source as Starr 2004. Contact: Shieldaig Export
Ltd, info@shieldaigexport.co.uk, +44 1520 755377. Interview conducted and recorded on April 16 2004,
answered questionnaire received on March 30 2004.
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Observable behavioural changes: “The removal of trawling has been fundamental to the
creation of a sustainable fishery and this change occurred before our involvement with
the MSC” (Starr 2004). Furthermore, the son of one of the fishermen developed in an
undergraduate thesis an escape panel to allow the smaller individuals to escape from the
creel before being lifted to the surface. This escape panel was developed as a final prod-
uct during the assessment process and its realisation might have been pushed by the fish-
ery’s desire to achieve certification.
The Creel Fishery decided to apply for MSC certification after it participated in a talk
that was organised by the MSC. The fishermen realised that they had to prove to the gov-
ernment that the measures they are using in the creel only zone are actually working in
terms of improving the fishery’s sustainability. They thought that they could use the in-
dependent certifier and the MSC classification as a sustainable fishery to satisfy a great
deal of the requirement that the government would have at the end of the five-year ex-
perimental period. In this respect, the Loch Torridon Nephrops Creel Fishery’s participa-
tion in the MSC programme is not motivated by economic incentives but a political deci-
sion. The creel fishery could continue without the zone system but it would lose ecologi-
cal as well as the local economical benefits. Since it would only take three trawlers that
do not necessarily land their catches to local companies, the Loch Torridon fishermen are
simply fighting for their jobs.
“We are going through this process not because we think we will immedi-
ately get a price benefit from having the MSC logo on our product. The
fishery approached the MSC because we see that an independent assess-
ment of our fishery as sustainable would be a significant help in the argu-
ment to extend the period for creel only fishing past the end of the five
year closure. It is necessary to protect the livelihoods of the people in-
volved. The MSC has been very useful in that, we used it much more as a
political than as a marketing tool” (Starr 2004).
Market impact of certification: Although Starr does not think that the Spanish consumers
are immediately willing to pay a higher price for products with the MSC logo, she points
out that the use of the MSC logo might raise the profile of the MSC in Spain in the fu-
ture. “Hopefully we will develop a cycle of effort that keeps going. If you manage to
raise the MSC profile, more consumers will be interested in having MSC products and
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vice versa” (Starr 2004). Her impression is that the MSC is trying to quickly increase the
number of certified fisheries in the world, in order to feed that cycle.
Summary: Summarising behavioural changes that the MSC has caused, it is to say that it
has influenced the way in which the fishery works. Primarily this has been, similar to the
other certified fisheries, by formalising the way in which it manages the stock and en-
suring that compliance with the rules is maintained. In this case the MSC might also have
contributed to the realisation of the escape panel.
“But the MSC has not been by any means the ONLY influence over our
fishing methods. The fundamental point is that we want this fishery to be
here in a hundred years time, still producing a livelihood for people. That
is why we made use of the MSC system, it fitted our needs incredibly
well” (Starr 2004).
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5 Analysis of the MSC
Based on the theoretical background considerations and on the case study, this section is
discussing in how far the Marine Stewardship Council is meeting our developed criteria
for having a high potential to exert environmental governance in the issue-area of fishing.
The argumentation will follow four steps:
(1) The appropriateness of the established rules: is the MSC code of conduct comprehen-
sive?
(2) The impact of the MSC rules on actors’ behaviour: does the MSC trigger change in
their behaviour?
(3) Theoretical contemplation about the MSC’s future prospects: questioning the MSC’s
legitimacy and accountability?
(4) Raising awareness: does the MSC raise stakeholders’ concern for problems related to
fishing?
5.1 The appropriateness of MSC rules
In this section attention is given to the appropriateness of the MSC rules. It is important
to consider because if the rules are not comprehensive enough, then the MSC could be
criticised for having a weak base.
The MSC’s Principles and Criteria took two years to develop. All in all the process in-
volved eight regional working groups around the world and two expert drafting sessions.
A wide variety of actors were included in the consultation to deliberate from all angles of
perspective. The actors included were from fisheries, environmental scientists, fisheries
managers and governmental representatives, environmental groups and a range of
stakeholders from the seafood sector – from catching to processing and retailing (MSC
2003).
In order to have a foundation, the United Nations Food and Agriculture’s Code of Con-
THE MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF A
PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
98
duct for Sustainable Fishing was used as a model to facilitate carefully considered dis-
cussion about what proponents to include and exclude. The standard needed to reflect
good fisheries management and the sustainability of fisheries. The FAO’s Code of Con-
duct is largely recognised throughout the fisheries sector as being “the most comprehen-
sive globally accepted consideration of the requirements for sustainable fisheries avail-
able and therefore provides a benchmark against which fisheries sustainability could be
measured” (Wessels et al. 2001). Thus, the MSC had to make sure its guidelines were
developed in accordance with that of the FAO’s so that consistency was maintained and
contradiction avoided.
As stated previously the MSC standard needs to reflect good fisheries management and
sustainability of fisheries, and does this regardless of factors such as size, complexity,
geography, intensity or technology. These factors need to be considered because the
MSC wants to be fair in what it is trying to do. Thus, the standard has been set to meas-
ure the sustainability of wild capture fisheries in developed and developing country fish-
eries alike. Moreover, the size of the fishery should also not restrict the certification pro-
cess as large scale fisheries that use sophisticated technology, as well as medium to small
scale and community based fisheries that use lower levels of technology, are considered
equally. In recognition of this point, the certified fisheries that have undergone the MSC
process thus far are in keeping with many of these factors. Small and large-scale fisheries
are included, which have different intensities and all use varying methods of capture.
Although the fisheries certified have their roots in many geographical locations, they
predominate so far in the developed regions. The MSC’s mantle to include those fisheries
in the developing regions is currently not looking very promising. This was an area in
which one critic was made about the MSC when the organisation was getting of the
ground. Brian O’Riordan noted in his paper ‘Who’s being seduced?’ that the “MSC’s
interest in the South would seem to be mainly as a source of fish products which could be
accredited. Fish sporting the MSC label will only be marketed in the North. It is unlikely
they will be sold in the South” (ICSF 1999). Although presently this is more or less the
case a concerted effort has been given to include the South. Right from the beginning the
MSC knew that it would have to bide its time in recognition of this point. Laura Cooper
of the WWF’s Endangered Seas Campaign explained in O’Riodan’s paper that ‘as far as
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the South is concerned, the application of the MSC to developing countries was being put
off until after the core programme was established’ (ICSF 1999). This highlights that
they know they have to approach the process in a different way. Consequently, it em-
ployed a consultant to devise a strategy for the South and now has the ‘Outreach pro-
gramme’.
According to Wessels “one of the most significant issues is whether or not to include
factors relating to the social and economic circumstances of the fishers and shore based
workers” (Wessels et al. 2001). This was an issue of contention at the 1998 FAO Te-
chinical Consultation on the feasibility of developing technical guidelines for ecolabel-
ling fisheries product. Nonetheless, after the lengthy consultation process had finished in
considering what exactly should be included in the MSC’s Code of Conduct, it was
deemed a necessity that the definition of a sustainable fishery should include it to be
conducted in a socially and economically fair responsible manner (Wessels et al. 2001).
Although attention is given to these factors the MSC Code of Conduct has come under
fire for not doing more. Barbara L. Neis, who works for the Department of Sociology at
Memorial University, Newfoundland, Canada, argues that the MSC could do more to
help women concerned with fisheries. She states that women are not even one of the
stakeholders considered in the sphere and are left out (Neis 1998). Alain Le Sann also
pointed out in his paper ‘Whose Labels? Whose Benefit?’ that the Code of Conduct pri-
marily focuses on the environmental aspects of resource management and not the social
ones. He states that the MSC does not give due attention to the welfare of workers and
market conditions. As the number of boats and fishermen in Europe has been declining,
the fishing effort has been increasing, therefore leading to unbearable workloads and an
increase in the number of accidents (Le Sann 1998).
With regards to the environmental and ecological aspects the MSC Code of Conduct is
fairly comprehensive, although this depends upon how one interprets their rules. The
MSC Principles and Criteria take into account the uncertainty by using the precautionary
principal. The problem with the precautionary principle exists in that there is no opera-
tional strategy for applying it, and no clarity on exactly how to define uncertainty (Wes-
sels et al. 2001). This still remains a problem for the MSC. Greenpeace states that this is
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one problem with the Principles and Criteria. It uses the precautionary principle in those
fisheries with depleted stocks. It criticises this use for if stocks cannot rebuild and re-
cover over time, and the MSC process helps to increase its strength in the market place,
they may inadvertently add to further depletion of the stock33
Moreover, Greenpeace site that no fishery should be certified that is subject to a single
species management regime. The MSC maintain that they use the ecosystem approach in
their certification approach, through using a multi-species approach, and giving due con-
sideration to the by-catch problem and discards. In this sense the MSC has made some
headway and is really trying to tackle the bycatch issue constructively as shown in the
cases.
Overall, it appears that the MSC rules are comprehensive but not exhaustive. They are
fairly similar to the FAO’s Code of Conduct, which is the flag in responsible fisheries.
Therefore, we regard them to be good enough to tackle many of the issues within fisher-
ies. Despite this claim, it has to be said that there is room for improvement in the rules.
The MSC structure allows for continued assessment of the rules from all stakeholders.
The real question that is brought up concerning the rules is whether a fishery should only
gain certification after improvements in the fishery have actually occurred, and not on the
basis of a promise of improvements? A fishery can enjoy the marketing advantages of the
MSC label for five years before it has to account for its conduct – ample time to secure a
dominant position in the market place. This remains a contentious issue, but the MSC
believes that they are going down the right path.
                                                
33 For a critique of Greenpeace on the MSC Principles and criteria visit
www.rcep.org.uk/fisheries/p2ewid/p2-greenpeacecritique-mscprinciples.pdf, accessed February 12th 2004.
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5.2 The Impact of MSC rules – tracing changes in actors’ behaviour
The most important criteria of the performance of a private governance mechanism is its
ability to alter actors’ behaviour in accordance with the established rules. In looking spe-
cifically at the influence upon the behaviour of fishermen, we assess that overall, few
changes have materialised in accordance with the MSC code of conduct for sustainable
fisheries.
This is not to say that the fisheries do not meet the required standards. They rather have
been operated in a way that already harmonised with the MSC code of conduct to a high
degree before their application for certification. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that
the fisheries are very different in nature and size. Five out of seven are fairly small, with
Total Allowable Catches ranging between only 40 t (Thames Blackwater Herring) to
10,000 t (Western Australian Rock Lobster) and are fishing for more exclusive, high
priced species such as cockles, shrimps, and lobster. Among the certified fisheries, only
the New Zealand Hoki as a whitefish fishery with annual landings of approximately
200,000 t and Alaska Salmon are considered to be large commercial enterprises. With
regard to the Marine Stewardship Council’s ambitious goal of addressing overfishing
globally, this is a fact that should not be forgotten.
The behavioural changes we could observe do not indicate that the fishermen had to alter
the way they fish, for example, through reducing the amount that they catch or changing
the season of when they fish. However, these kinds of changes might be the ones that are
needed to contribute to the solution of global overfishing. Therefore, we rate the changes
that were triggered through the Marine Stewardship Council overall as minor effects.
What the MSC has done is to concentrate on the issue of bycatch. This fishing issue is of
controversial importance and although most of the certified fisheries in the MSC profile
are considered to not have a problem with bycatch, the MSC has made sure that each
fishery addresses its effects concerning this regard. Explicitly, in the case of the Loch
Torridon Fishery they have implemented the work of an undergraduate student who de-
veloped an alteration to the gear used so that bycatch can be minimised. Furthermore, in
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the case of the New Zealand Hoki, ways to minimise the bycatch have been extensively
looked at, as this is a contentious issue to stakeholders in the area. Currently, trials are
carried out on gear usage to specifically reduce bycatch to seals, birds and (something).
Due to the size of the hoki fishery, this change caused by the MSC might have the big-
gest ecological impact.
Other than by-catch, fishermen in some fisheries have had to alter the way they record
their data. As shown in section 3.1.2, reliable data is of great importance for fisheries
management, and although the fisheries so far certified have adequate recording methods
in conjunction with national and international standards and laws, the MSC has helped to
improve the situation further. In the case of the Thames Blackwater Herring Fishery the
MSC has influenced the fishery to now record exactly where they fish, how much they
fish and what by-catch is caught. In the case of the Australian Rock Lobster Fishery the
MSC has added an extra category for the fishermen to fill out concerning exactly what
interactions/catch they have of ICON species such as sea mammals. Furthermore, a
monitoring programme has been designed to record all interactions/catch with ICON
species. The fishermen have agreed to these specifics demands indicating a change in
their attitude. In fact, the fishermen have already started to fill out and send back volun-
tary questionnaires relating to their experiences with these species.
Other observable changes relate to the actors other than the fishermen themselves. In all
cases the MSC process has required the formulisation of a management plan of the fish-
eries. Therefore bringing about some kind of standardisation. Principle 2 of the MSC
(fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, productivity, func-
tion and diversity of the ecosystem) has had the biggest effect in this regard. The eco-
system approach within fisheries is not the norm and is requiring changes in thinking
about how managers view and carryout the management plans. The MSC principles and
criteria have meant that fisheries under their label pay more attention to this point. This is
why the MSC is in the process of helping fisheries carryout Ecological Risk Assessments
in order to then carryout a more comprehensive Environmental Management Plan.
In light of the ‘FAO’s Technical Consultation on the feasibility of developing technical
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guidelines for ecolabelling fisheries products’ from 1997, the MSC has tried hard to
gather and maintain a broad base of stakeholders involvement at every stage in the certi-
fication process. Good management within fisheries requires the input of all
stakeholders, in order to take into consideration all possible views. The case studies
highlight the ongoing efforts to achieve this. The Thames Herring case emphasises this
point with the reestablishment of the Herring Management Committee. This is a clear
indication that some actors are making a concerted effort to converse with others to im-
prove the fisheries.
The issue of building co-operation and communication between actors is shown in the
Alaska Salmon example. This is through the MSC trying to improve the sharing of
knowledge in hope of producing a better situation. Although communication between the
regulatory bodies is adequate, some criticism has been given concerning how they may
be delivering contradictory messages by not sharing resources.
Overall, the increased participation of stakeholders, created because of the MSC process,
is a healthy sign. The fact that stakeholders are voicing the opinions and are being lis-
tened to is exemplified in the Lobster case where the Conservation Council of Western
Australia. They have been given funding to employ an officer specifically to enhance
communication between environmental groups and other actors.
The Marine Stewardship Council certification had different economical effects on a wide
group of stakeholders involved. One of the goals of the MSC is to strengthen the eco-
nomic foundation of the fishery by giving the fishery a market advantage over its com-
petitors. The analyses reveals that the results for this are mixed. In some circumstances
the MSC has positively contributed by 1) increasing the price of the commodity; 2)
helping to establish the product in new markets and consolidating the product in older
ones; and 3) reducing the vulnerability of price volatility. Despite these gains, some fish-
eries have so far not economically benefited from the MSC process.
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Table 6: Overview of behavioural effects of MSC rules upon stakeholders.
Fishery Behavioural effects of certification upon stakeholders
Thames B
lackwater Herring Driftnet
Fishery
♦ recording of by-catch
♦ formalisation of management plan
♦ improved co-operation and communication through rees-
tablishment of stakeholder group
♦ governmental involvement through financial aid
Western Australian Rock Lob-
ster
♦ recording of by-catch
♦ ecological risk assessment
♦ formalisation of management pan
♦ increased participation of stakeholders
♦ increased awareness (15% increase of inquiries)
♦ reduction of EU tariffs on the product
Alaska Salmon ♦ recording of by-catch
♦ stock assessment
♦ formalisation of management plan
♦ improved stakeholder communication
♦ raising of profile in the market place
New Zealand Hoki ♦ recording of by-catch
♦ change of gear to reduce by-catch
♦ formalisation of management plan
♦ raising of profile in the market place
♦ increase in revenue (commitment of Unilever to buy the
product)
Burry Inlet Cockles ♦ formalisation of management plan
♦ governmental involvement through financial aid
South West Mackerel Han-
dline Fishery
♦ formalisation of management plan
♦ recording of by-catch
♦ improved knowledge-brokering
♦ increase of price in the market place
Loch Torridon Nephrops
Creel Fishery
♦ development of the escape panel
♦ formalisation of management plan
♦ influence upon government (extension of the five year ex-
perimental zones)
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5.3 Consideration of the MSC’s legitimacy and accountability
As mentioned in chapter one, an exhaustive effort to assess the MSC’s governance po-
tential does not solely focus on criteria such as effects on stakeholder behaviour or ap-
propriateness of the created rules. We already analysed that the MSC is exerting govern-
ance to a limited degree. In doing so, it is theoretically taking over functions of states and
public actors – so far, however, only to a very limited degree. While public actors are
seen as legitimised to allocate values authoritatively and enforce rules, the status of pri-
vate actors in this respect is often unclear. Therefore, the argumentation turns now to
questions of (a) the legitimacy and (b) the accountability of the Marine Stewardship
Council.
The reflections in chapter 2 highlight the ongoing debate about a general lack of effec-
tiveness in international governance systems and new forms of governance that are cur-
rently emerging. Some authors refer to this lack as the governance systems’ reduced out-
put legitimacy (Scharpf 1998a, Brühl and Rittberger 2002). We follow Scharpf in the
distinction of legitimacy in input and output legitimacy. In general, output legitimacy is
achieved or maintained whenever “collectively binding decisions serve the common in-
terest of the constituency” (Scharpf 1998b, 3). The common interest of the constituency
in fishing can be defined as a sustainable use of the resource. As discussed above, inter-
national governance systems have not been sufficiently effective in dealing with existing
problems and have thus failed, for the most part, to achieve output legitimacy. Facing
transnational environmental problems, it might be conceivable to allow output-oriented
legitimacy to compensate for a lack of input-oriented legitimacy (grounded in the possi-
bility of stakeholders to influence policies). MSC rules are supposed to serve the com-
mon interest of sustainable resource use; however, there is not much evidence that they
produce an outcome in fisheries governance that differs substantially from the one that
public actors already maintain. Accordingly, there is so far only very little evidence that
the MSC proves to possess or even to increase output legitimacy. Nevertheless, conceiv-
ing of legitimacy derived from the quality of outputs as a substitute for the lack of input
legitimacy can be problematic, given that such a form of legitimacy is not democratic in
and of itself (Papadopoulos 2003, 483). Hence, it is indispensable to turn to the second
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category of legitimacy concerning the input side.
“As more and more public policies are made by or in international institutions, the gen-
eral public or particular stakeholders are frequently excluded from their deliberations and
decisions. Thus, input legitimacy is reduced as well” (Brühl and Rittberger 2002, 22).
Input legitimacy is given when collectively binding decisions derive from the constitu-
ents’ active consent (Scharpf 1998a, 85). Participation and consent thus are essential
elements of input legitimacy. As Brühl and Rittberger further remark,
“The addressees’ acceptance of norms and rules as binding hinges on their
participation in creating and implementing them. Effective governance de-
pends both on the invention of beneficial solutions to pressing social needs
and on general access to the political process. The subjects’ loyalty can be
obtained only by preserving their right to participate actively in political
decision-making processes” (Brühl and Rittberger 2002, 23).
Fisheries management is a very prominent example for a constellation in which the ad-
dressees of regulation, the fishermen, do often not accept regulation and try to bend rules
that where created in a com-
mand-and-control approach.
Being kept away from the po-
litical process, actors tend to
ignore the established order
whenever feasible. Does the
MSC increase input legitimacy
through stakeholder involve-
ment? The MSC tries to gather
and maintain a broad base of
stakeholder involvement at
every stage in the certification
process. The formulation of the
code of conduct took, as shown
in section 5.1, two years and
included a wide variety of ac-
tors, thus paying attention to the
Flowchart 4: Stages of stakeholder input in the assess-
ment process.
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question of input legitimacy. Furthermore, the case studies deliver hints to the input le-
gitimacy of the Marine Stewardship Council in showing that stakeholders are getting
involved in the decision-making processes. Their influence on different stages of an as-
sessment is shown in flowchart 4.
“The MSC promotes its process as open and transparent. Certifiers are re-
quired to be proactive in identifying stakeholders and soliciting comments
from such stakeholders on a fishery’s conformance, or lack thereof, with
the MSC standard. A certifier’s final determination on certification can be
challenged through an Objections Procedure that can result in the MSC
Board of Trustees establishing a panel to consider the challenge.” (Gilmore
2003, 2).
However, when one agrees with the demand for democratic structures in the international
system, legitimacy is not solely a question of in- and output. As Keohane explains, in
democratic theory, individuals are regarded as inherently equal, in fundamental rights,
and political power is granted to officials by the people, who can withdraw that authority
in accordance with constitutional arrangements. “The legitimacy of an official action in
democracy depends in part on whether the official is accountable” (Keohane 2002, 2). An
accountability relationship is one in which an individual, group or other entity makes
demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to impose costs
on the agent. (Keohane 2002, 12). Furthermore, one has to make a distinction between
internal and external accountability. The case studies showed that MSC is internally ac-
countable to its stakeholders. In the case of the New Zealand Hoki, the Royal Forest and
Bird Protection Society of New Zealand (RFBPS) complained to the MSC against the
certification and asked that the certificate be withdrawn. This complaint was referred to
the Board of Trustees of the MSC who subsequently convened a panel to conduct an ap-
peal process, providing an example for a situation in which stakeholders made a demand
on the MSC to report and question its actions. Nevertheless, with regard to external ac-
countability, there is no institutionalised relationship to an authoritative agent that holds
the MSC accountable. The MSC, however, is depending on the funding of around thirty
organisations, including trusts, companies, individuals, and agencies. One could argue
that these agents hold the MSC accountable to their interests, which polarises the MSC’s
external accountability away from the main stakeholders in fisheries.
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5.4 Concern-raising through the MSC
Without concern for the issue of unsustainable fishing, the MSC could not exist. It ulti-
mately depends on the consumers’ behaviour, which are expressing their preferences in
purchasing decisions. The US based Seafood Choices Alliance published a study on the
marketplace for sustainable seafood, stating that, overall, the surveyed consumers show
relatively little interest in the sustainability of the fish species they are buying. However,
75% of respondents said they did not have enough information to base purchasing deci-
sions on sustainability issues (Seafood Choices Alliance 2003). Consequently, a very
important task for the MSC is to raise the awareness of consumers for the labelled prod-
ucts. This thesis does not undertake a market survey, though, the case studies indicate
varying successes. For the lobster, hoki, salmon and mackerel fisheries the market
seemed to have responded to the certification. As David Muirhead sums up, “the Marine
Stewardship Council was very helpful and encouraged the fishery through good market-
ing and promotion of its products” (Muirhead 2004).
In contrast, the lack of demand for labelled herring and the unaltered demand for labelled
cockles and nephrops indicates that the MSC does not manage to increase consumer con-
cern in these cases. Karen Starr from the Loch Torridon Nephrops Fishery does not think
that consumers are immediately willing to pay a higher price for products with the MSC
logo. However, she hopes that the ever-growing distribution of MSC labelled products in
Spain will cause a feedback loop in which concern will increase (Starr 2004). Phil Coats
from the Burry Inlet Cockle Fishery also makes the experience that concern for sustain-
able fished cockles is low, yet he hopes for future market development as well (Coates
2004).
“Consumer access to the product is key to the effectiveness of the eco-label. The effec-
tiveness of the eco-label also depends on consumer awareness of the label. (...) Aware-
ness is generally a result of a successful promotion” (Roheim 2002). Therefore, an im-
portant impact determining the MSC’s potential is its PR-work and awareness raising
measures. In this respect, the potential of the MSC rises with the extent to which it is able
to promote and communicate its work. There are various ways that the Marine Steward-
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ship Council can appeal to the consumers. For the MSC it is imperative that it engages
with retailers for they are the actors most involved with the consumer. In order to do so,
the MSC operates a commercial section to enlist major seafood buyers to participate in
the labelling programme and to build brand familiarity with the consumer. Some of the
largest supermarket corporations around the world (predominantly in North America and
Europe) are supporting the MSC programme, carrying MSC labelled product in their
stores and doing major promotions of these seafood products. Thus, consumer access to
MSC – products is growing, especially as the supermarkets attitudes are very positive,
with a continued commitment to carry and promote MSC labelled products. Sainsbury’s
for example, a leading supermarket in the UK, became the first retailer in the world to
commit to ensuring that all of the wild fish sold in its supermarkets would be sourced
from sustainable fisheries by 2010 (MSC, 2003). Furthermore, they have sponsored a
three-year project to investigate management of tuna fisheries around the world and
whether the MSC Principles and Criteria could be applied in their cases. This highlights
the supermarkets commitment to the MSC programme and its desire to raise the aware-
ness of its consumers. The MSC also conducts an outreach programme to encourage sup-
port among members of the environment community of a market-based approach to pro-
mote sustainable fishing.
Overall, there are two main factors that restrain the MSC’s performance to raise concern
so far: the limited amount of certified products available, and the short period of avail-
ability of these products in the market place. A MSC memorandum prepared for its
Stakeholder Council in August 2003 notes that products baring the MSC logo have been
on sale for just over two years and the MSC has yet to conduct a consumer awareness
programme in order to improve its profile.
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6 Conclusions
This thesis tries to grasp and analyse the phenomenon ‘Marine Stewardship Council’
from an International Relations perspective. In this understanding, the MSC provides an
innovative private governance mechanism whose role and functions in global environ-
mental policy need to be scrutinised. The underlying global governance debate suggests
that the engagement of private actors in rule making and implementation on a global
level increasingly challenges and complements established governance systems that are
becoming ineffective. Accordingly, this thesis aims to generate a deeper understanding
for the problems and opportunities of the Marine Stewardship Council. For clarification
it poses the question ‘what is the potential of the MSC to exert environmental governance
in the issue area of fishing?’ Four criteria for governance potential are developed: (1)
appropriateness of rules, (2) legitimacy of the governance mechanism, (3) behavioural
changes of stakeholders triggered through the governance mechanism, and (4) the ability
of raising concern. On the basis of our analysis we come to the following conclusions:
Governance has at least two aspects: (a) the making and (b) the implementation of rules.
The MSC is making rules that potentially contribute to a sustainable management of the
resource fish. This assessment is based upon the understanding that the MSC standard is
similar to the ‘Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries’ of the United Nations Food
and Agricultural Organisation. This is universally considered to be comprehensive
enough to provide a guiding light for sustainable fishing. Therefore, the MSC has made
appropriate rules but questions to the legitimacy of these rules are outstanding.
The analysis of the seven certified fisheries does not deliver evidence for a high output-
legitimacy of the Marine Stewardship Council. As defined above, output legitimacy is
achieved or maintained whenever rules serve the common interest of the constituency.
The MSC adds only minimally to serving the common interest of sustainable fishing
through the evidence shown in these cases. Overall, the environmental performance of
these certified fisheries was already appraised as sustainable before their actually in-
volvement with the MSC. Consequently, it is most likely that the output of the already
existing governance systems would not differ substantially without the certification-
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programme. In contrary to the output dimension, it appears that the MSC possesses a
relatively high degree of input-legitimacy. There are great efforts to include a wide vari-
ety of stakeholders into the process of rule making and the assessment of the fisheries.
The high input-legitimacy of the MSC rules and assessment decisions could thereby in-
crease the acceptance of and compliance with its decisions. Accordingly, this input-
legitimacy suggests a theoretically noticeable potential of the MSC to exert governance.
In sum, the MSC is internally accountable to its stakeholders, while its external demo-
cratic accountability is restricted to donators and consumers and therefore gives rise to
concern. These agents might be able to express their demands on the MSC and hold it
accountable to themselves through funding and purchasing decisions; but they are neither
inherently equal in their ability to do so, nor are they necessarily the people who are af-
fected by the MSC rules.
Measuring the Marine Stewardship Council against the most important criteria, its effects
on the behaviour of fishermen, counterfactual reasoning (following the question - what
would the fishermen do without the MSC?) reveals that it has not caused major changes.
Ergo, it is to conclude that the MSC exerts governance only to a rather limited degree.
There is no evidence yet that it has the power to implement environmentally decisive
rules. Moreover, the cases of Burry Inlet Cockles, Thames Blackwater Herring and Loch
Torridon Nephrops show that the basis of the governance mechanism, namely the mar-
ket-based instrument of eco-labelling, does not always work. The market did not respond
to certification in these cases and the fisheries do not have an incentive to continue the
costly annual assessment procedure apart from their future expectations of the label. In
fact, without additional financial aid from the state, two fisheries are most likely going to
withdraw from the programme. Thus, the MSC loses for the most part its power to de-
mand any behavioural changes and to govern these fisheries.
In order to classify the private governance mechanism MSC in the context of the global
governance debate, it is essential to reflect on its scale. In this regard, the analysis points
out two factors that appear to be crucial and will ultimately limit the scale to which the
MSC could possibly exert environmental governance: (a) the overall market share of eco-
labelled products on the demand side, and (b) the size of the certified fisheries and their
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current fishing capacity on the supply side. A recent study on the future prospects of la-
belled organic food and beverages in the OECD countries shows that their share of total
food sales in 2002 ranges between only 0.5% and 3.7% (Yussefi and Willer 2003, 25).
Some argue that consumers who are buying fish would show a higher concern for their
food in general and would therefore be more likely to buy eco-labelled fish. Even if the
market-share of eco-labelled fish should be significantly higher than the statistics on or-
ganic agricultural products indicate at the moment, consumer demand is limiting the
MSC’s power to exert governance. This directs the attention to the boundaries in which
the MSC is captured. It also calls into question the position of proponents of a global
environmental governance architecture in which private actors are supposed to play a
major role in rule-making such as the initially quoted Executive Director of the Business
Council for Sustainable Development (section 1.3).
Five out of seven fisheries turned out to be relatively small; therefore talking about pri-
vate global governance through the MSC in the area of fisheries management would
probably be exaggerated at this point in time. The MSC’s goal to develop market-based
incentives for better management of the world’s fisheries and to help achieve global sus-
tainable seafood production on the one hand side, and the certification of some small-
scale, well-managed, exclusive lobster, cockles and nephrops fisheries on the other, do
not seem to match up.
This thesis’ definition of ‘governance potential’ does, however, bear in mind future de-
velopments. In respect thereof, the case studies of the fisheries unravel an interesting
pattern. It appears that the Marine Stewardship Council is at a turning point in its short
history. The MSC follows a strategy of trying to get many well-managed fisheries on
board in order to push labelled products in the market, gain publicity and increase con-
cern. In this respect, even the fairly small fisheries might be helpful to ‘kick-start’ the
MSC programme. Karen Starr calls this a cycle of effort in which the MSC tries to raise
its profile in order to increase concern and consumer demand and vice versa (Starr 2004).
Although the certification did not pay off financially for the cockle fishery, Phil Coats is
of the opinion that it is one of the ideal early projects to give the MSC initiative credibil-
ity, momentum, and publicity. He believes, that at a certain point the label could become
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firmly established and no market supplier could afford to remain uncertified (Coats
2004). It is conceivable that the MSC’s power to trigger changes in actors’ behaviour
will increase. The number of fisheries thus far certified is small, yet between March and
April of this year three new fisheries have been awarded certification. There are 11 fish-
eries undergoing the ‘full assessment process’ and therefore the MSC predicts greater
expansion in the near future. Several significant fisheries are comprised among this
group including the Alaska Pollock. This fishery is with landings of about 1.5 million t
per annum the largest fishery in the United States. Its certification would most likely
have major beneficial impacts on the limiting supply side of consumer access to eco-
labelled fish products and might trigger a feedback-loop in which the whole governance
mechanism is strengthening. Jim Humphreys, the Director of the MSC’s Americas Re-
gional office in Seattle, recently added
“we’re seeing more and more fisheries wanting to be certified to both pro-
tect their fisheries for the long term and to provide new marketing oppor-
tunities for their products.  Also, we’re seeing an increasing number of
products being offered in more outlets which educates the consumer about
responsibly managed fisheries and allows them to choose whether to buy
seafood from certified sources.  It’s a preference for certified fish which
has and will continue to drive our growth by providing incentive for addi-
tional fisheries and companies to become involved” (MSC, 2004).
Overall, the analysis reveals that while the MSC’s potential to exert environmental gov-
ernance in the issue area of fishing remains limited at present, it is likely that it increases
in the near future. With regards to the global governance debate, however, the case study
in the environmental area provided evidence that private governance initiatives will only
be able to complement public governance systems in a restricted manner.
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7 Perspectives
What are the roles and functions of private actors and initiatives in global governance?
There seems to be consensus that international governance systems are to a large extent
ineffective in solving trans-sovereign problems. “Finding ways to close these governance
gaps is one of the most prominent tasks of politicians and political scientists” (Brühl and
Rittberger 2002). In this respect, partnerships of different actors in different constella-
tions have recently raised great expectations. In analysing a private environmental gov-
ernance initiative, we did not find the remedy that closes global governance gaps. How-
ever, what we found is an optimistic perspective. There is evidence of the involvement of
private actors in rule making and implementation in the environmental area and there is a
lot of indication that it will grow. Due to the dynamic character of the MSC and the up-
coming certification of several large-scale fisheries, this initiative deserves to be kept
under further surveillance.
 “Coercion and bargaining will be the chief means of influence, not persuasion and emu-
lation. Hence the state will remain a central actor. Power will not be diffused” (Keohane
2002). Even though the power of private governance mechanism to implement rules is
tied to market or moral authority, and might therefore remain limited, private rule mak-
ing could provide a catalyst for public agents to react. In this respect, it will be interesting
to follow the development of the Marine Stewardship Council and investigate whether it
triggers a cascade of norms that affects the co-operative behaviour of states and interna-
tional organisations. We concentrated on the MSC’s impacts on the stakeholder level.
Therefore, what needs to be further investigated are the effects of the MSC on a national
political system level and on the global political system level. Through further analysis of
these points one might find more vital evidence that the tide is turning for the MSC. A
future research agenda should focus on other co-operative forms of governance. In this
respect, states might react to incorporate private governance initiatives such as in many
of the Johannesburg Type-II partnerships.
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9 Appendix
9.1 The MSC Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing
At the centre of the MSC is a set of Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing
which are used as a standard in a third party, independent and voluntary certification
programme.  These were developed by means of an extensive, international consultative
process through which the views of stakeholders in fisheries were gathered.
These Principles reflect a recognition that a sustainable fishery should be based upon:
• The maintenance and re-establishment of healthy populations of targeted species;
• The maintenance of the integrity of ecosystems;
• The development and maintenance of effective fisheries management systems, taking
into account all relevant biological, technological, economic, social, environmental
and commercial aspects; and
• Compliance with relevant local and national local laws and standards and international
understandings and agreements
The Principles and Criteria are further designed to recognise and emphasise that man-
agement efforts are most likely to be successful in accomplishing the goals of conserva-
tion and sustainable use of marine resources when there is full co-operation among the
full range of fisheries stakeholders, including those who are dependent on fishing for
their food and livelihood.
On a voluntary basis, fisheries that conform to these Principles and Criteria will be eligi-
ble for certification by independent MSC-accredited certifiers. Fish processors, traders
and retailers will be encouraged to make public commitments to purchase fish products
only from certified sources.  This will allow consumers to select fish products with the
confidence that they come from sustainable, well-managed sources. It will also benefit
the fishers and the fishing industry who depend on the abundance of fish stocks, by pro-
viding market incentives to work towards sustainable practices. Fish processors, traders
and retailers who buy from certified sustainable sources will in turn benefit from the as-
surance of continuity of future supply and hence sustainability of their own businesses.
The MSC promotes equal access to its certification programme irrespective of the scale
of the fishing operation.  The implications of the size, scale, type, location and intensity
of the fishery, the uniqueness of the resources and the effects on other ecosystems will be
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considered in every certification.
The MSC further recognises the need to observe and respect the long-term interests of
people dependent on fishing for food and livelihood to the extent that it is consistent with
ecological sustainability, and also the importance of fisheries management and opera-
tions being conducted in a manner consistent with established local, national, and inter-
national rules and standards as well as in compliance with the MSC Principles and Crite-
ria.
Preamble
The following Principles & Criteria are intended to guide the efforts of the Marine Stew-
ardship Council towards the development of sustainable fisheries on a global basis. They
were developed assuming that a sustainable fishery is defined, for the purposes of MSC
certification, as one that is conducted in such a way that:
• it can be continued indefinitely at a reasonable level;
• it maintains and seeks to maximise, ecological health and abundance,
• it maintains the diversity, structure and function of the ecosystem on which it de-
pends as well as the quality of its habitat, minimising the adverse effects that it
causes;
• it is managed and operated in a responsible manner, in conformity with local, na-
tional and international laws and regulations;
• it maintains present and future economic and social options and benefits;
• it is conducted in a socially and economically fair and responsible manner.
 The Principles represent the overarching philosophical basis for this initiative in stew-
ardship of marine resources: the use of market forces to promote behaviour which helps
achieve the goal of sustainable fisheries.  They form the basis for detailed Criteria which
will be used to evaluate each fishery seeking certification under the MSC programme.
Although the primary focus is the ecological integrity of world fisheries, the principles
also embrace the human and social elements of fisheries. Their successful implementa-
tion depends upon a system which is open, fair, based upon the best information avail-
able and which incorporates all relevant legal obligations.  The certification programme
in which these principles will be applied is intended to give any fishery the opportunity
to demonstrate its commitment to sustainable fishing and ultimately benefit from this
commitment in the market place.
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Scope
The scope of the MSC Principles and Criteria relates to marine fisheries activities up to
but not beyond the point at which the fish are landed. However, MSC-accredited certifi-
ers may be informed of serious concerns associated with post-landing practices. 34
The MSC Principles and Criteria apply at this stage only to wildcapture fisheries (in-
cluding, but not limited to shellfish, crustaceans and cephalopods). Aquaculture and the
harvest of other species are not currently included.
Issues involving allocation of quotas and access to marine resources are considered to be
beyond the scope of these Principles and Criteria.
Principle 1
A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing or depletion
of the exploited populations and, for those populations that are depleted, the fishery must
be conducted in a manner that demonstrably leads to their recovery 35:
Intent:
The intent of this principle is to ensure that the productive capacities of resources are
maintained at high levels and are not sacrificed in favour of short term interests.  Thus,
exploited populations would be maintained at high levels of abundance designed to retain
their productivity, provide margins of safety for error and uncertainty, and restore and
retain their capacities for yields over the long term.
Criteria:
1. The fishery shall be conducted at catch levels that continually maintain the high
productivity of the target population(s) and associated ecological community
relative to its potential productivity.
2. Where the exploited populations are depleted, the fishery will be executed such
that recovery and rebuilding is allowed to occur to a specified level consistent
                                                
34 Other complementary certification programmes (e.g., ISO 14000) provide opportunities for documenting
and evaluating impacts of post landing activities related to fisheries products certified to MSC standards.
Constructive solutions to address these concerns through appropriate measures should be sought through
dialogue with certification organisations and other relevant bodies.
35 The sequence in which the Principles and Criteria appear does not represent a ranking of their signifi-
cance, but is rather intended to provide a logical guide to certifiers when assessing a fishery.  The criteria
by which the MSC Principles will be implemented will be reviewed and revised as appropriate in light of
relevant new information, technologies and additional consultations.
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with the precautionary approach and the ability of the populations to produce
long-term potential yields within a specified time frame.
3. Fishing is conducted in a manner that does not alter the age or genetic structure or
sex composition to a degree that impairs reproductive capacity.
Principle 2:
Fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, productivity, func-
tion and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and associated dependent and
ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends.
Intent:
The intent of this principle is to encourage the management of fisheries from an ecosys-
tem perspective under a system designed to assess and restrain the impacts of the fishery
on the ecosystem.
Criteria:
1. The fishery is conducted in a way that maintains natural functional relationships
among species and should not lead to trophic cascades or ecosystem state
changes.
2. The fishery is conducted in a manner that does not threaten biological diversity at
the genetic, species or population levels and avoids or minimises mortality of, or
injuries to endangered, threatened or protected species.
3. Where exploited populations are depleted, the fishery will be executed such that
recovery and rebuilding is allowed to occur to a specified level within specified
time frames, consistent with the precautionary approach and considering the abil-
ity of the population to produce long-term potential yields.
Principle 3:
The fishery is subject to an effective management system that respects local, national and
international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and operational frame-
works that require use of the resource to be responsible and sustainable.
Intent:
The intent of this principle is to ensure that there is an institutional and operational
framework for implementing Principles 1 and 2, appropriate to the size and scale of the
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fishery.
A.  Management System Criteria:
1. The fishery shall not be conducted under a controversial unilateral exemption to
an international agreement.
The management system shall:
2. demonstrate clear long-term objectives consistent with MSC Principles and Crite-
ria and contain a consultative process that is transparent and involves all inter-
ested and affected parties so as to consider all relevant information, including lo-
cal knowledge. The impact of fishery management decisions on all those who de-
pend on the fishery for their livelihoods, including, but not confined to subsis-
tence, artisanal, and fishing-dependent communities shall be addressed as part of
this process;
3. be appropriate to the cultural context, scale and intensity of the fishery – reflect-
ing specific objectives, incorporating operational criteria, containing procedures
for implementation and a process for monitoring and evaluating performance and
acting on findings;
4. observe the legal and customary rights and long term interests of people depend-
ent on fishing for food and livelihood, in a manner consistent with ecological
sustainability;
5. incorporates an appropriate mechanism for the resolution of disputes arising
within the system36;
6. provide economic and social incentives that contribute to sustainable fishing and
shall not operate with subsidies that contribute to unsustainable fishing;
7. act in a timely and adaptive fashion on the basis of the best available information
using a precautionary approach particularly when dealing with scientific uncer-
tainty;
                                                
36 Outstanding disputes of substantial magnitude involving a significant number of interests will normally
disqualify a fishery from certification.
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8. incorporate a research plan – appropriate to the scale and intensity of the fishery –
that addresses the information needs of management and provides for the dis-
semination of research results to all interested parties in a timely fashion;
9. require that assessments of the biological status of the resource and impacts of the
fishery have been and are periodically conducted;
10. specify measures and strategies that demonstrably control the degree of exploita-
tion of the resource, including, but not limited to:
a) setting catch levels that will maintain the target population and ecological
community’s high productivity relative to its potential productivity, and ac-
count for  the non-target species (or size, age, sex) captured and landed in asso-
ciation with, or as a consequence of, fishing for target species;
b) identifying appropriate fishing methods that minimise adverse impacts on
habitat, especially in critical or sensitive zones such as spawning and nursery
areas;
c) providing for the recovery and rebuilding of depleted fish populations to speci-
fied levels within specified time frames;
d) mechanisms in place to limit or close fisheries when designated catch limits are
reached;
e) establishing no-take zones where appropriate;
11. contains appropriate procedures for effective compliance, monitoring, control,
surveillance and enforcement which ensure that established limits to exploitation
are not exceeded and specifies corrective actions to be taken in the event that they
are.
B.  Operational Criteria
 Fishing operation shall:
12. make use of fishing gear and practices designed to avoid the capture of non-target
species (and non-target size, age, and/or sex of the target species); minimise
mortality of this catch where it cannot be avoided, and reduce discards of what
cannot be released alive;
13. implement appropriate fishing methods designed to minimise adverse impacts on
habitat, especially in critical or sensitive zones such as spawning and nursery ar-
eas;
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14. not use destructive fishing practices such as fishing with poisons or explosives;
15. minimise operational waste such as lost fishing gear, oil spills, on-board spoilage
of catch, etc.;
16. be conducted in compliance with the fishery management system and all legal
and administrative requirements; and
17. assist and co-operate with management authorities in the collection of catch, dis-
card, and other information of importance to effective management of the re-
sources and the fishery.
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9.2 Contact list of the interviewees
Name Fishery Contact Interview Procedure
Ronan Roche Thames Blackwater
Herring
The Essex Estuaries
Initiative, Colchester
Borough Council, PO
Box 885, Colchester
Essex, CO1 1ZE
Tel: +44 (0)1206 282480
Recorded telephone
interview
Phil Coats Burry Inlet Cockles South Wales Sea Fish-
eries Committee
(SWSFA)
Phil Coates / Mark Staf-
ford, Queen’s Buildings
Cambrian Place
Swansea SA1 1TW
Tel: + (0) 1792 654 466
E-mail: swsfc@aol.com
Questionnaire
David Muirhead South West Handline
Mackerel Fishery
South West Handline
Fishermen’s Association.
David Muirhead
Triss Rose Cottage,
The Lizard, Helston
Cornwall
Telephone: 01326
555813
Fax: 01326 563 828
Recorded telephone
interview
Karen Starr Loch Torridon Nephrops
Creel Fishery
Shieldaig Export Com-
pany Limited
Telephone: +44 (0)152
075 5366
Mobile: +44 (0)773 306
3079
Recorded telephone
interview + question-
naire
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9.3 Contact list of independent certifiers
Moody Marine
Ltd
Salisbury House
Stephenson's
Way
The Wyvern
Business Park
Derby DE21
6LY
UK
Tel: +44 (1704)
834 644
Fax: +44 (1332)
675 152
Contact: Dr.
Andrew Hough
Email:
ahough@moody
marine.com
Website:
www.moodymar
ine.com
Organizacion
Internacional
Agropecuaria[OI
A]
Av.Santa Fe 830
Acassuso
(B1641ABN)
Buenos Aires
Argentina
Tel: +[54-11]
4798 9084
Fax: +[54-11]
4793 4340
Contact: Pedro
A. Landa
Email:
oia@oia.com.ar
Website:
www.oia.com.
ar
Scientific Certi-
fication Services
2000 Powell
Street
Suite 1350
Emeryville,
CA 94608
U.S.A.
Tel: +1 510 452
8000
Fax: +1 510 452
8001
Contact: Dr Chet
Chaffee
Email:
chaffe3@attglob
al.net
Website:
www.scs1.com
SGS Product &
Process Certifi-
cation
PO Box 200
Malledijk 18
3200 AE Spi-
jkenisse
The Netherlands
Tel: +31 181
693292
Fax: +31 181
693572
Contact: Aldin
Hilbrands
Email:
aldin_hilbrands
@sgs.com
Website:
www.sgs.com
Tavel Certifica-
tion Inc.
2000 Barrington
Street
Suite 502, Cog-
swell Tower
Halifax
Nova Scotia P3J
3K1
Canada
Tel: +1 902 422
4511
Fax: +1 902 422
9780
Contact: Steve
Devitt
Email: sde-
vitt@tavel.ca
Website:
www.tavelcertif
y.com
TQCSI - MSC
Quality House,
117A Tapleys
Hill Road,
Hendon, 5014,
South Australia,
Australia
Tel: + 61 8 8347
0603
Fax: + 61 8 8445
9423
Contact: Craig
Bates, MSC
Manager or Jade
Minhard, MSC
Coordinator
Email: craig-
bates@jlbates.co
m.au
website:
www.tqcsi.com
